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Abstract
Hegemonic stability theory been the focus of substantial scholarly attention 
in recent years. Hegemonic stability theory is a theory that attempts to explain 
changes in the degree to which the international political economy is "open" or 
"restricted" on the basis of the power relations between the major states in the 
world system. Specifically, the theory holds that markets will tend to be most 
open when one state is clearly predominant, particularly in terms of economic 
power, and, conversely, that markets will tend to be restricted when there is no 
predominant power.
From the end of World War II until the late 1960s or early 1970s, the 
United States was the hegemonic power in the world economy. The U.S. was 
particularly predominant in the period from 1945 through roughly 1960. Since 
the early 1960s, the U.S. has gradually lost position relative to that of other 
major economic powers. If the theory of hegemonic stability is valid, this should 
cause trade levels to decline as a percentage of aggregate economic activity.
This dissertation presents a general examination of hegemonic stability 
theory. This includes discussion of different variants of the theory, as well as 
discussion of the internal logic of the theory. Hegemonic stability theory is tested 
statistically, utilizing the case of American hegemony in the post World War II 
period. Finally, the findings of the statistical test are discussed in terms of their 
implications for the international political economy of the coming decades.
vi
Introduction
This dissertation examines the "theory of hegemonic stability." Hegemonic 
stability is a theoretical perspective that is concerned with international trade 
policy. Specifically, this theory is concerned with the relationship between the level 
of economic power of the dominant state in the international economy (when one 
state clearly is dominant), and the degree to which international trade increases 
or decreases.
I present an examination of hegemonic stability which begins with a basic 
presentation of the theory, and a critique of some of the other works related to 
the theory. This necessarily includes a discussion of concepts such as "free trade" 
and "public goods," as these concepts are central to the theory of hegemonic 
stability. I also present a statistical test of the theory, and discuss the implications 
of the results thus derived for the international economy of the coming several 
decades.
An examination of hegemonic stability theory may be useful in understanding 
the trading policies of states of all levels of development. The central question 
with which the theory is concerned is under what conditions the core, or the most 
developed states, maintain relatively open trading policies. This in turn has a 
significant effect upon the trading policies of peripheral, or less developed states, 
as well as upon the trading policies of semi-peripheral states, or states at a 
medium level of development. Finally, as will be made evident, hegemonic 
stability theory has important general implications for the world political economy.
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This dissertation will be set forth in five chapters. Chapter One presents 
the theory of hegemonic stability with an emphasis upon the central tenants of 
the theory. In Chapter Two I consider the major work that has been done to 
date regarding hegemonic stability theory, and examine some of the commonalities 
and differences exhibited by in the perspectives of scholars who have written about 
the theory.
Chapter Three discusses U.S. policy in the post World War II period in 
terms of its orientation toward the establishment and maintenance of an open 
international economic order. Hegemonic stability theory is also discussed in 
terms of its application in making predictions as to whether or not there will 
continue to be an open international economic order with there being no 
hegemonic power.
Chapter Four presents a statistical test of the theory of hegemonic stability. 
In Chapter Five, the results of the statistical test is be discussed. Finally, these 
results are used to present a brief prognosis as to the possible changes in the 
international economic order over the coming several decades.
Chapter One
3
The Theory of Hegemonic Stability
In recent years a number of scholars have advocated a theoretical perspective 
regarding international trade policy that appears to offer fresh insights. This 
perspective attempts to explain changes in the openness or restrictedness of 
international trade, and thus of the relative level of international trade, in terms 
of the distribution of state power among the core states. In particular, the concern 
is with the degree of control one particular state is able to exercise over the 
trading policy of the other core states. This perspective has come to be known 
as the "theory of hegemonic stability."
The theory of hegemonic stability holds that a world order dominated by 
a single country will be most stable and will have the most open economic 
order.1 It is further held that greater aggregate wealth will be produced under 
such a world order. This view is summed up well by Peter Katzenstein, who 
maintains that "Periods of imperial ascendance are distinguished by the politics 
of plenty," while 'Periods of hegemonic decline, on the other hand, are marked
1 Stability, in the context utilized by a number of advocates of 
hegemonic stability theory, such as Charles Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin, 
refers to an international system with free trade, high levels of foreign 
investment, and a well-functioning international monetary system. The 
system will be called stable only if disagreements between core states 
regarding international economic policy are relatively few in number and 
do not result in the establishment of major impediments to free trade or 
impediments to regularized exchange of currencies. Such a system is 
generally termed a "liberal economic order." Obviously, the term stability 
is used in a heavily normative context here.
by the ’politics of scarcity’" (Katzenstein 1977: 9). Charles Kindleberger refers 
to this as "a system of world economy based on leadership (Kindleberger 
1981:251). According to Kindleberger, a liberal economic order 
needs leadership, a country which is prepared, 
consciously or unconsciously, under some system of 
rules it has internationalized, to set standards of 
conduct for other countries; and to seek to get others 
to follow them... (Kindleberger 1973: 28).
Similarly, Robert Gilpin maintains that a liberal international economy can 
only be formed and maintained through the support of the most powerful state 
or states in the system (Gilpin 1975:85). By the term "liberal economic order," 
both Kindleberger and Gilpin are referring to an international economy with an 
open market and with readily available currency conversion. In Gilpin’s view, the 
efforts of a country in a position of hegemony are required in order to provide 
for "a secure status quo free trade, foreign investment, and a well-functioning 
international monetary system" (Gilpin 1981: 145). Kindleberger refers to this 
as the provision of public, or cosmopolitan, goods (Kindleberger 1981: 247). A 
public good is one the consumption of which by one unit does not reduce the 
amount available for other units (Kindleberger 1981: 243). Whether or not a 
hegemonic state is required in order to provide these "public goods," it is clear that 
these factors are positively related to trade among core countries. Kindleberger 
is most concerned with the maintenance of "free trade." Indeed, the maintenance 
of free trade is held to be the major result of hegemonic stability.
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Despite the substantial attention given to the concept of hegemony, there 
is no single agreed upon definition of the term. One problem is that the term 
hegemony has been used in a number of different manners; in some cases these 
have little relationship to one another. For example, the term is sometimes used 
to describe direct control of one unit over another, with the control being 
exercised through political or military means. One such case is the manner in 
which Chinese diplomats have referred to "Soviet hegemony." Within the context 
of hegemonic stability theory, hegemony is basically an economic concept, although, 
as I briefly discuss below, it cannot be considered in complete isolation from 
non-economic factors. Unfortunately, even within the context of economic theory 
in general, and hegemonic stability theory in particular, there is not a standardized 
definition. Timothy J. Mckeown notes that while it may not be necessary to 
establish a precise share of world capabilities as a threshold that a state must reach 
in order to be considered as being hegemonic, it is at least necessary to be able 
to determine what relative distributions of capability are required (McKeown 1983: 
76). Unfortunately, McKeown himself does not make such explicit 
determinations. Indeed, definitions of hegemonic stability have tended in general 
to be rather vague. For example, Robert Keohane defines it as follows:
The theory of hegemonic stability, as applied to the 
world political economy, defines hegemony as 
preponderance of material resources (Keohane 
1984:32).
This definition is not only of little use operationally, but does not even serve 
adequately for Keohane’s own descriptive purposes, as his discussion of hegemony
centers around the formation and maintenance of regimes by the hegemon, not 
merely control over resources. Immanuel Wallerstein defines hegemony in 
economic terms as:
a situation wherein the products of a given core state 
are produced so efficiently that they are by and large 
competitive even in other core states, and therefore the 
given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a 
maximally free world market (Wallerstein 1980: 38).
This definition is more specific and subject to examination than that of Keohane, 
although again no specific limits are set as to just what conditions must be met 
in order for a system to be a hegemonically controlled system.
In terms of military capabilities, the minimum requirements in order for 
there to be a hegemonic order is also in question, although here there is a greater 
level of agreement than that regarding economic factors (see section on military 
power below). In practice, there is no disagreement about when the major 
periods of hegemonic control have occurred. Precisely when hegemonic control 
ends, however, is much less clear. For purposes of analysis, it is best to view 
hegemonic control on a continuum, rather than attempting to define arbitrary limits 
for hegemonic control. The w ould-be hegemon’s level of preponderance of trade 
and economic size are the major factors upon which this continuum should be 
based.
Hegemony, in the context of hegemonic stability theory, is primarily an 
economic term that should not be confused with the many non-specific uses of 
the term, based upon a more general concept of power, that are in common use.
Nonetheless, the strong relationship between military and economic power is too 
important to be ignored. Military power and economic power certainly are not 
synonymous with one another, but each is dependent upon the other. In order 
to forge and maintain a hegemonic order, a hegemon must posses certain requisite 
military capabilities. For example, it must be able to prevent other states from 
using military power to limit access to its key markets. At the same time, of 
course, military power depends, in part, upon economic power. Military power 
cannot be maintained without a sound economic basis. While military power will 
not be directly included the statistical analysis, it must be recognized that the 
economic hegemony that is the focus of the present work would not be possible 
without related military power.
Free Trade and Reciprocity
"Free trade” is the cornerstone of liberal trading policy. Classical economic 
theory holds that free trade is the most efficient basis upon which to allocate 
resources. Free trade may be said to exist when three basic conditions are met. 
First, there must be no tariff mechanisms, as these may make imported goods 
noncompetitive with domestically produced goods. Second, there must be no 
product subsidies, due to the advantages these confer upon the producers of the 
subsidized goods. Third, import quotas must also not exist. When these 
conditions are met, the market is said to be "unrestricted" or "open". The "ideal 
type" of free trade would be a situation in which all of these conditions are met 
completely. In practice, of course, these conditions are never completely present;
instead the question is just how close to completely these conditions are met. 
Other factors that may cause some reductions in trade, such as production and 
licensing agreements, are not considered to be part of the restrictedness of a 
market, as these are not structural barriers to the importation of other goods.
Another central component of a liberal trade policy is the principal of 
reciprocity. In some instances, reciprocity may be based upon accords providing 
strict guidelines that are designed to insure that the principle of reciprocity is 
followed. Even in lieu of explicit agreements, reciprocity is implicitly required in 
order for free trade to be maintained. Reciprocity in this context may be defined 
as "actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that cease 
when these expected reactions are not forthcoming" (Blau 1964: 6). If one state 
allows goods to be imported from another state without subjecting them to a 
tariff, but does not receive reciprocal treatment, it will tend to change its policy 
(through reciprocating), with the establishment of a tariff.
Although some form of equivalency is a part of most conventional
understandings of reciprocity, absolute equivalence is not a part of all reciprocal
relationships. Indeed, reciprocity can be present in a relationship among unequals, 
where exchanges are not based upon full equivalence (Keohane 1986: 6). This 
understanding of reciprocity is different from that in much of the political
literature, where reciprocity often has meant absolute equivalence. Nonetheless, this 
has not been the case in much of the sociological literature, such as in the Blau 
definition cited above. In this context, reciprocity means that there is equivalence 
of form, but not necessarily of benefits. For example, there may be a reciprocal 
trade agreement between a highly developed and a lesser developed state. In such
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a case the rules regulating exchange may be the same for each party, but benefits 
may not be at all equally distributed. This will be discussed more fully below.
Differential Effects of Open Trading Systems
Kindleberger, and, indeed, liberal economists in general, maintain that free 
trade is beneficial to all states, and that a hegemon is necessary in order to 
maintain such free trade. The provision of free trade is thus seen as being a 
public good. In other words, it is a good that may be shared, to advantage, by 
all states. Kindleberger states that although both small and large states benefit 
from "leadership" (his term for the efforts exerted by a hegemon to maintain a 
liberal economic order), the benefits are often even greater for small states than 
for large ones. This is due to the fact that smaller states are more often able to 
adopt the role of a "free rider." An example of a free rider in this context would 
be a small country that is militarily protected by a large one, and as a result does 
not need to maintain a defense force of its own. In a similar vein, Kindleberger 
argues that where a hegemon exercises leadership, the costs for maintaining the 
system (i.e. the maintenance of a steady flow of capital, a stable currency 
exchange, etc.) are disproportionately paid by the hegemon, and to a lesser degree 
by other relatively large members of the system (Kindleberger 1976:19, 32). This 
is in accord with the economic theory of public goods, which hypothesizes that 
public goods are under produced due to free riding (Kindleberger 1976: 19). 
Kindleberger also assumes that states of all levels of economic development benefit 
from "leadership" (Kindleberger 1976:19). Kindleberger thus maintains that the
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hegemon performs duties that make it a sort of benevolent benefactor for the 
system, whereas he clearly indicates that many other states, particularly smaller 
states, benefit from the system without performing sufficient tasks related to the 
maintenance of the system.
Kindleberger’s assertion that small states tend to benefit most from
hegemonic stability, particularly with regard to the maintenance of free trade, may
be correct in strictly economic terms. International trade generally accounts for 
a larger portion of the aggregate economic activity of these states than is the case 
for larger states, due to the smaller internal markets of the smaller states. 
Nonetheless, the situation for less developed states is quite different.
Kindleberger’s assumption that free trade will be beneficial even for less 
developed states is derived directly from classical economic theory. Classical 
economic theory holds that free trade is essential in order to maintain proper 
competition. The law of comparative advantage establishes the basis for this 
conclusion. According to the law of comparative advantage, the profitability of 
trade lies in the fact that certain states or individuals can always produce given 
goods or services more efficiently than others. This perspective holds that 
... such situations may arise when there are money
and exchange rates that disguise the real goods
exchange, and when governments interfere with the 
market determination of the exchange rate. But the 
principal remains valid that there always must be 
some activity in which a country has a comparative 
advantage (Grubel 1981: 15).
It is maintained on this basis that free trade is the most beneficial basis of 
exchange for states of all levels of development, and thus, that an open trading 
system is beneficial to all states. Certainly this view is held by most 
contemporary economists in the United States, and there has been remarkably 
little scholarly criticism of this position in the U.S. This is even more the case 
in U.S. governmental circles. Nonetheless, there are numerous problems with the 
above statement. The following two points are particularly important in this 
regard. First, more developed states will always have a comparative advantage 
v is -a -v is  a much wider range of goods and services than is the case for less 
developed states. Second, there are always some government interventions in the 
market that place restrictions upon trade; at some points in time there simply are 
less than others. Less developed states tend to be more greatly disadvantaged 
through such interventions than more developed states, since they have less 
economic or political power to bring to bear in order to secure their interests.
There is a growing body of literature, much of it coming from outside the 
U.S., that provides considerable evidence to support the contention that the degree 
to which a state benefits from the existence of free trade is, in fact, strongly 
affected by the level of development of the state (Prebisch 1980). This is dealt 
with in great detail especially in dependency theory and world system’s theory 
literature (Emmanuel 1972; Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1979). While there is 
general agreement among both liberal economists and dependency and world 
systems theorists that free trade will be maintained only with the existence of a 
hegemon, the motives and results assumed by dependency theorists and world 
systems theorists are quite different from those assumed by liberal economists.
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For the former, concern centers upon the problem of unequal exchange (Amin 
1976; Emmanuel 1972). According to this perspective, much trade between 
developed and less developed countries is detrimental to less developed countries, 
due to the considerably higher amounts of labor that generally are required to 
produced goods sold from less developed to the developed countries, than vice 
versa, for goods priced at the same level. This type of trade thus is unequal, and 
results in a continual loss of value for the less developed countries.
It is extremely difficult for less developed countries foster new industries 
'when operating in direct competition with industries from more developed 
countries. When a less developed country is penetrated by goods from more 
highly developed countries, domestically produced products are generally greatly 
disadvantaged unless the costs of the foreign goods are driven up substantially 
through the use of tariffs, or domestic goods are subsidized (the latter is generally 
a less feasible policy for LDCs, as sufficient capital for such subsidies is generally 
not available). This is due to the lower costs of production in the developed 
countries made possible through more efficient means of production and greater 
economies of scale.
Not surprisingly given its competitive advantages, a state that has a very 
strong market advantage is most likely to want to secure free trade. For 
example, in the first half of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was able to 
produce many goods at a substantially lower cost than other states due to the 
technological advantages conferred by its early industrialization. The amount of 
labor time required for the manufacture of these goods was much lower than 
elsewhere, and British goods could readily be priced at levels far below that of
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the competition. This gave Great Britain a huge advantage over competitors 
without the protection of tariffs or product subsidies. As British exports 
penetrated more and more markets with its goods, additional advantages were 
gained through more favorable economies of scale. Therefore, the maintenance of 
free trade in the international system was extremely important to British interests.
It is important to note that the U.S. itself industrialized behind a system 
of heavy tariff barriers in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Without 
protection against British industrial goods, this development would have at least 
been greatly impeded, and probably made impossible. Indeed, the debate over 
free trade was a principal cause of the American Civil War. Southern planter 
interests wanted to continue to purchase cheap British goods, whereas northern 
industrial interests realized that they could develop only with protection against 
such goods. The British advantages in terms of both economies of scale and 
technology were simply too large to be overcome without such protection.
The Movement from Free Trade to Restriction
The example of Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century provides 
an excellent example of a hegemon’s position with regard to market openness. 
From the end of the Napoleonic wars until the period of 1870-1880, Britain was 
clearly the preeminent economic power in the world. In 1870, Britain accounted 
for 24 percent of world trade (Lake 1983: 525). Also, Britain accounted for 
31.8% of the world’s production of manufactured goods; in this category they 
remained even above the U.S. (although by the period of 1881-1885, the U.S.
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had surpassed Britain in this category; the percentages were 28.6 and 26.6 
respectively). Britain’s nearest European competitor in manufactured goods, 
Germany, accounted for only 13.2% of the world’s manufactured goods. The 
second major competitor, France, accounted for 10.3% (League of Nations 1945: 
13). By 1880 Britain still had the highest per capita income in the world, and 
accounted for approximately double the share of world trade and investment of 
France, its closest competitor in trade and investment. The only major areas in 
which Britain had been surpassed were in aggregate economic size; the U.S. 
economy was by this time the largest in the world, and in the level of 
manufactures. Nonetheless, the U.S. was not yet a major player in matters of 
international economics, and was generally not integrated into the international 
political economy. U.S. trade and investment remained extremely low, relative to 
that of France and Germany, much less Britain. For this reason, Britain remained 
virtually unchallenged as the world’s major economic force.
When the power of a hegemon begins declining precipitously relative to 
that of other core powers, there is a strong tendency for it to move away from 
a free trade posture. Although Britain remained the preeminent economic power 
in terms of world trade and investment after 1870, it was rapidly loosing ground 
to the U.S. and Germany, among others. British colonies began to erect trade 
barriers to which only British goods were exempted, particularly in the 1890s. 
Additionally, Britain began to re-introduce major tariffs on imported goods, 
although this did not occur until 1915. It should be noted in this context that 
a hegemon’s retreat from a free trade posture is generally a long, gradual process. 
As we may see, although British power was declining relative to that of other
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major states after 1870, the retreat from a free trade posture war certainly not 
immediate. There is considerable inertia present in the system. Nonetheless, from 
the 1870s on, Britain no longer worked to maintain an open economic order. 
Eventually, Britain itself enacted tariff legislation.
With the end of the Second World War, the U.S. quickly became established 
as the new hegemon. The major industrial powers of Europe, Great Britain, 
France, and Germany, were in a shambles both in terms of their physical plants 
and in terms of economic organization in general. The U.S. emerged from the 
war far stronger than the other major actors, both economically and militarily. 
U.S. policymakers quickly worked to reorder the international economic system 
in a manner believed to be conducive to U.S. interests. In particular, the U.S. 
sought to establish a new economic order based upon a system of free trade 
similar to that forged by the U.K. in the nineteenth century. The U.S. was the 
principal architect of a number of international institutions and agreements designed 
to facilitate this economic order, including the Bretton Woods monetary accord, 
and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions will 
be discussed more fully in Chapter Four.
As was the case with Britain of the 1870s, however, the U.S. is now no 
longer at the apex of its power, and continues to decline in terms of its share 
of world trade and investment (for a more complete discussion, see Chapter 
Four). It must be emphasized that we are referring here to relative, rather than 
to an absolute decline in U.S. power. As a result, a number of tariffs against 
specific goods have been put in place, and there is a strong movement toward the 
erection of further tariff barriers. Whereas in the early decades after World War
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II the U.S. had sought to convince the nations of the world that free trade was 
in everyone’s best interest, the U.S. is now beginning to retreat somewhat from 
this stance. Thus it is clear that free trade is an important part of the ideology 
of those with the most advantaged position, and that this ideology begins to 
change as advantage is eroded.
There is an interesting paradox regarding hegemonic decline that seems, at
first glance, to run counter to the theory of hegemonic stability. There is a
tendency for a declining hegemon to enter into a series of reciprocal trade 
relationships. For example, beginning in the 1870s, Great Britain gradually entered 
into such trade relationships, particularly with its own colonies. It might seem
that this would serve to increase trade. However, the actual effect is quite the
opposite. Movement from open trade relations to trade relations based upon
reciprocal trade agreements tends to reduce,rather than to increase the aggregate
\
level of trade in the system. This is due to the fact that reciprocal trade 
agreements confer specific advantages upon the parties to the agreement, thus 
creating competitive disadvantages for other parties. Other states tend to
reciprocate by also entering into reciprocal arrangements. Therefore, competition 
is reduced, and the aggregate level of trade tends to decline. Thus, the fact that 
declining hegemons enter into such reciprocal relations serves as a support to the 
theory of hegemonic stability.
The impetus for the establishment of protectionist policies for a declining 
hegemon may, of course, come initially from government circles or may emanate 
from various pressure groups or the most basic constituency level. Regardless of 
the national source of such an impetus, it is the contention of hegemonic stability
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theoiy that this impetus is the result of the hegemonic decline itself. As the 
hegemon becomes less able to dominate trade, jobs tend to be lost and wage 
levels tend to decline, or at least to decline in their rate of growth. Therefore, 
pressure to institute protectionist policies is likely to come from a variety of 
sources. The important point for the present analysis is the contention that such 
pressure comes as a result of the hegemon’s decline.
Military Power
The question as to the means a hegemon uses in order to foster an open 
international trading system is of central importance to hegemonic stability theory. 
Particularly, it is necessary to consider the question as to whether economic or 
military initiatives are best suited for such purposes. Stephen Krasner states that 
where there are dramatic asymmetries between the capabilities of the hegemon and 
weaker states, the hegemon may use military power to coerce the weaker states 
to adopt an open trading structure. However, he emphasizes that force is not a 
very efficient means of changing economic policies, and that it is particularly 
unlikely that force will be utilized to change the policies of medium-sized states 
(Krasner 1976: 322). Robert Keohane also notes that it is difficult in the 
contemporaiy world for' a hegemon to use military power directly to attain its 
economic policy objectives with its military partners and allies (Keohane 1984: 
40).
Instead, Krasner argues that the hegemonic state may best use its economic 
resources in order to create an open trading structure. This may take the form
18
of positive incentives, such as offering access to its domestic market and its 
relatively cheap exports, or of negative sanctions, such as the withholding of aid 
or engagement in competition in third country markets that may ruin the second 
country’s chance for exports (Krasner 1976: 322-323).
Robert Keohane notes that a hegemonic state must "be able to protect the 
international political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile 
adversaries" (Keohane 1984: 39). Nonetheless, he further notes that a state need 
not be dominant militarily w orld-w ide in order to be hegemonic. Neither British 
power in the nineteenth century, or American power in the decades following 
World War II, ever reached such a level. Throughout the nineteenth century Great 
Britain was challenged by the continental European powers, and even at the apex 
of American power following World War II, the Soviet Union presented a 
challenge to American dominance. Nonetheless, Britain was able to dominate the 
international political economy through most of the nineteenth century, and the 
U.S. was able to do so between late 1945 and the early 1970s.
The military conditions for economic hegemony are 
met if the economically preponderant country has 
sufficient military capabilities to prevent incursions by 
others that would deny it access to major areas of its 
economic activity (Keohane 1984: 40).
If these military conditions are not met, hegemony may be ended rather quickly. 
Immanuel Wallerstein points out that Dutch economic hegemony in the seventeenth 
century was destroyed through the use of military force by Great Britain and
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France (Wallerstein 1980: 3 8 -3 9 ). Lack of sufficient military power to protect 
its markets thus led to the end of Dutch hegemony.
Differences in the level of International Trade between Small and Large Industrial 
States
In general, international trade accounts for a greater portion of the economic 
activity of small states than of large ones (Krasner 1976: 319). Small states in 
this context refers to states with relatively small populations; particularly where 
the population is below ten million. Notable among small highly industrialized 
states, for example, are Denmark and Finland. The reasons that trade accounts 
for a particularly large portion of economic activity of small states are quite clear. 
Small states generally have to import more goods per capita than larger states due 
to the fact that small states are less able to manufacture all of the specific goods 
that are desired. Additionally, exports are particularly important to smaller states 
because their internal markets are not sufficiently large to provide favorable 
economies of scale. Many goods cannot be produced efficiently in small 
quantities. Therefore, while exports are important for all states in terms of 
economies of scale, this is particularly so for smaller states. Largely because of 
these factors, at any given time there will be wide variations among states in 
terms of their ratios of trade to national income2, even among states of relatively 
equal levels of development. Specific trade policies of the different countries do,
■y
National Income is often used by various authors as synonymous 
with Gross National Product. Gross National Product is used as the measure 
of National Income in this analysis.
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of course, have some affect here. It is the change in this ratio for each individual 
state over time with which we are concerned. If the theory of hegemonic stability 
is correct, there should be a general decline in the proportion of trade to national 
income as the market becomes more restricted due to the failure of the hegemon 
to maintain an open market.
Obviously, at any given time certain states will have particular policies 
designed either to increase or decrease their level of international trade. For 
example, a given state may wish to decrease its level of imports in either a 
selective or general manner. A selective approach would be utilized to protect 
the development or continuance of specific industries. A general reduction in 
the level of imports may be desired in order to ameliorate an unfavorable balance 
of trade. Certainly the trade policies of smaller states are often based upon 
considerations different from those of larger states, given their extreme market 
vulnerability due to their particularly high levels of trade. Nonetheless, structural 
factors constrain the manner in which a state may act to change its balance of 
trade. In some cases, the simple fear that the imposition of tariffs may cause 
other states to reciprocate will be sufficient to deter the implementation of such 
a policy. In a system dominated by a hegemon, the hegemon may bring various 
pressures to bear in order to insure that other states maintain a free trade posture. 
In some instances, this may even take the form of direct military intervention.
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International Political Economy
It should be clear from the discussion of hegemonic stability theory in this 
chapter that this work falls clearly within the realm of international political 
economy. While there clearly is a strong economic component, there is a strong 
political component as well. Indeed, hegemonic stability theory cannot be 
considered in a strictly economic context.
Much of the pressure that a hegemon brings to bear on other states in 
order to secure a liberal international economic order is brought within a political 
context. Even threats of economic sanctions, while certainly within the realm of 
economics, also have a strong political component. Economic threats cannot be 
viable without other supporting factors. For example, a militarily weak state is 
not able to use economic sanctions within the same latitude of circumstances
as is a militarily strong state. Additionally, the particular groups of allies that
a state has may be a key determinant of whether or not that state is in a 
position to use economic sanctions in specific situations.
Finally, it should be noted that the aggregate nature of the world political 
economy has major ramifications for international politics. For example, the U.S. 
clearly is today less able to dictate the terms under which the international
political economy is regulated than in the period in which the U.S. had greater
economic power relative to other major industrialized states. The form of 
international economic organization (such as the degree to which the system is 
"open" or "restricted") is thus determined by both economic and political factors. 
We could not speak of the existence of a hegemon on the basis of economic
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factors alone. In turn, the form of international economic organization has 
significant ramifications for international politics in general. Certainly, for example, 
the question of military balances and struggles in the Middle East cannot be 
discussed without reference to both regional and global economic factors v is -a -  
vis oil. In Chapter Four, some of the specific ramifications of the changing world 
political economy for international politics in general will be discussed.
In the next chapter, some of the major work that has been done by a 
number of scholars regarding hegemonic stability theory will be discussed. In 
particular, the question of the manner in which different versions of the theory 
are similar, and the manner in which they diverge will be examined.
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Chapter 2
In this chapter major literature related to hegemonic stability will be
examined. First, what has come to be known as "regime analysis" will be
discussed. This represents a modification to hegemonic stability theory that some 
scholars maintain is necessary in order for the theory to work. "Cycle theory" is 
also discussed, as the cycle theory literature strongly overlaps with the hegemonic 
stability theory literature. Some of the similarities and differences in the work 
of various scholars doing work regarding hegemonic stability are also examined. 
Finally, we will examine an article that attempts to test hegemonic stability theory 
by utilizing a group of case studies; perhaps the only major test of this form to 
date.
Regime Analysis
Some theorists have criticized the theory of hegemonic stability, at least in
the form in which it is generally presented. Robert Keohane argues that in its
crudest form, the theory has little analytical value. He asserts that the theory 
fails to explain lags between changes in power 
structures and changes in international regimes; does 
not account well for the differential durability of 
different institutions within a given issue-area and 
avoids addressing the question of why international
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regimes seem so much more extensive now in world 
politics than during earlier periods (such as the late 
19th Century) of supposed hegemonic leadership 
(Keohane 1982: 326).
He proposes that the primary problems of the theory can be greatly mitigated 
by focusing upon the relationship between the concentration of power in the 
international system and the supply of international regimes.1
We will use Keohane’s definition of regimes as
those arrangements for issue areas that embody implicit 
rules and norms insofar as they actually guide 
behavior of important actors in a particular issue area 
(Keohane 1980: 133).
Keohane advocates the use of "a structural approach to international regime change, 
differentiated by issue area" (Keohane 1980: 154). Three such issue areas cited 
by Keohane are the international petroleum regime, the international monetary 
regime, and the international trade regime.2 It is his contention that eroding 
U.S.hegemony is helpful in accounting for changes in the international petroleum 
regime, less so for the international monetary regime, and even less to the 
international trade regimes (it should be noted that he provides little empirical 
evidence to justify this contention).
1 The phrase "supply of international regimes" comes from Keohane, 
and is used here to help illustrate his view of the context within which 
international regimes are formed.
In this dissertation, the more general version of the theory of 
hegemonic stability is the theory being addressed, except when it is noted 
otherwise.
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In this work, the concentration is directly upon matters of international 
trade; thus the primary concern is with issues that Keohane would include as 
components of the international trade regime Indeed, it is international trade 
that is the central focus of hegemonic stability theory as espoused by Kindleberger 
and most other theorists. Nonetheless, it is my contention that issue areas should 
not be differentiated within the context of hegemonic stability theory in the 
manner suggested by Kindleberger. I will also argue that Keohane’s conclusions 
are based, at least in part, upon erroneous reasoning.
While differentiation by issue areas certainly has face validity and may be 
of some analytical utility, whether the issue areas may be separated as clearly as 
Keohane suggests is questionable at best. It is clear, for example, that the 
international trade regime has strong structural links with the international 
monetary regime. For example, international trade is highly affected by changes 
in international monetary policy. Thus, these issue areas do not form mutually 
exclusive categories.
Second, some of the explanations Keohane offers for changes in the different 
regimes seem questionable. For example, in his explanation of changes in the 
international trade regime, he notes,
Most explanations of increased protectionism also focus 
on the recession of the 1970s and the rise of 
manufactured exports from less developed countries,
(a position which Keohane supports) (Keohane 1980:
153).
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While this argument is undoubtedly largely correct, it misses the key point. The 
seriousness of the recession itself, although a part of the general boom and bust 
cycle, was more than likely deepened by the lack of monetary control due to the 
breakup of the Bretton Woods international monetary regime; a matter which 
Keohane himself discusses at length, but does not relate to the seriousness of 
recession. Perhaps even more importantly, the rise of manufactured exports from 
less developed countries relative to those from the hegemonic (or previously 
hegemonic) power is itself a manifestation of the erosion of hegemony. Therefore, 
this certainly cannot properly be used as an argument against hegemonic stability 
theory in the manner suggested by Keohane. Again, the structural links between 
the regimes analyzed by Keohane are much more important than he suggests.
Despite some of the problems suggested above, regime analysis has become 
increasingly common in the international relations literature in recent years. 
Although the acceptance of regime analysis has not been unequivocal, criticism has 
been relatively limited. Nonetheless, a few scholars have suggested that the utility 
of this form of analysis may be less than is generally accepted. Indeed, Susan 
Strange argues that not only is this the case, but further asks
whether it may not even be actually negative in its 
influence, obfuscating and confusing instead of 
clarifying and illuminating, and distorting by concealing 
bias instead of revealing and removing it (Strange 
1982: 479).
While Strange advances a number of excellent arguments against the use of 
regime analysis, her argument regarding bias is particularly noteworthy. The
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primary bias lies in the fact that there is a general assumption that everyone 
wants more and better regimes (Strange 1982: 478). It is interesting to note 
in this context that in the same issue of International Organization in which 
Strange’s article here cited appeared (an issue focusing on regime analysis), one 
of the articles is even titled "The Demand for International Regimes" (by Robert 
Keohane). The assumption that regimes are desired by all (or, at least most) 
is quite common. Strange further points out this bias by quoting from the earliest 
draft of editor Stephen Krasner’s introductory article to the above cited volume 
of International Organization:"... .the most fundamental concern of social theory: how 
is order established,maintained and destroyed?" (Krasner 1979). Not included as 
primary concerns of social theory here are questions such as those relating to 
justice or other normative considerations. Although Strange does not delve more 
fully into the factors influencing the direction of social theory, it is clear how 
strongly structural functionalism has influenced much of the literature.
It is entirely possible that most states do, in fact, desire there to be 
international regimes, but this certainly does not mean that most desire the types 
of regimes that have been established since the end of World War II (an 
assumption generally made in the American literature). Many of the regimes 
that are in place have been highly detrimental to many less-developed countries. 
That many do not desire the same types of regimes as those favored by the U.S. 
and to some extent other Western powers is clear (a simple examination of U.N. 
General Assembly votes is telling in this regard).
Further, a number of states have gone beyond the point of simply rejecting 
the extant regimes, and have proposed the formation of new regimes, or, at least
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major alterations in existing ones. An excellent example of proposed regime 
creation and alteration is the proposal by a large portion of the world’s developing 
states for the development of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO). 
This includes, for example, a call for a major redistribution of international credit 
(the formation of a new credit regime). It also includes a call for the developing 
states to have a much larger voice in structures existing under present regimes, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Krasner notes that the distribution of votes and power in international 
organizations is often not congruent with the distribution of state power (Krasner 
1985: 75). He further notes that "During periods of hegemonic decline there is 
a propensity to move from congruence to incongruence or even to dynamic 
instability" (Krasner 1985: 75). As he points out, one of the ironies is that 
hegemonic powers tend to create international regimes that include international 
organizations that initially serve their interests, but that later may be restructured 
by other actors for other purposes. A good example of this is the International 
Court of Justice. Thus far, this type of restructuring has not taken place with 
any of the major international monetary institutions,such as the Word Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund. This is due to the disproportionate number of votes 
of the United States (and, to a lesser degree, of other major economic powers 
such as West Germany, France, and Great Britain).
It should be noted that a determination that regime analysis of the type 
suggested by Keohane is not tenable does not mean that we should not discuss 
specific regimes. Indeed, one can certainly refer to specific regimes, such as the 
international monetary regime, for analytical purposes. However, reference to a
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regime in this manner does not imply that regimes may be studied separately in 
the manner of Keohane’s work. In this dissertation, when the term regime is 
used, it refers to a particular set of implicitly understood rules for a given issue 
area (in the manner of Keohane’s own initial definition), but does not imply the 
type of relative issue autonomy of the type that is inherent in Keohane’s work.3
Cycle Theory
Cycle Theory is a theory of international political economy that contains 
hegemonic stability as a central component. Indeed, in cycle theory the central 
manner in which the world system is characterized is in terms of the degree to 
which it is a system dominated by a hegemon or the degree to which there is 
core competition. A  number of analysts, particularly world systems theorists 
such as Wallerstein, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, among 
others, maintain that the system alternates between periods of hegemony and 
periods of core competition on a more or less regular basis (Chase-Dunn and 
Rubinson 1977: 463). It is their contention that this alternation has taken place 
since the sixteenth century, the beginning of what Wallerstein terms the modem 
world system.
The alternation between hegemony and core competition is generally divided 
into two primary phases. The A -phase is the period in which one particular state
3 As a byproduct of the statistical test of hegemonic stability theory 
presented in Chapter Four, the theory is, in fact, tested with regard to 
Keohane’s concept of looking at the international trade regime separately. 
One of the three basic equations that is utilized is concerned solely with 
factors involving international trade, and may be used as a test of 
Keohane’s version of the theory pertaining to an international trade regime.
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is greatly increasing its economic power relative to that of other core states. The 
A -phase lasts until the time when the hegemon has reached the pinnacle of its 
power. After this time follows a period in which the economic power of the 
hegemon declines relative to that of other core states. The hegemon may, in fact, 
still be growing economically in absolute terms, but nonetheless be losing ground 
in relative terms due to more rapid growth of other core states. The period of 
decline is termed the B-phase. Taken together, the A -phase and B-phase 
constitute a systemic cycle which begins with a period of core competition, enters 
a phase in which the system is dominated by a hegemon, and then returns to a 
period of core competition. Another cycle then follows.
A number of scholars have argued that these cycles occur in a regularized 
time frame. For example, this may take the form of long waves of roughly 
determinant length, such as the Kondratieff wave, a hypothetical business cycle 
wave lasting approximately forty years (Kondratieff 1979). Nonetheless, while 
there is substantial evidence to support the existence of general cycles (at least 
over the past several hundred years), the evidence indicates that the periods of 
time required for the cycle to run its course varies from case to case (Bergesen 
1981: 187-188).
George Modelski, like Wallerstein, places the beginning of the modem world 
system around 1500 (Modelski 1978: 214). He asserts that since this time, the 
world system may be seen as having gone through a series of cycles with an 
average period of just over one hundred years (Modelski 1978: 217). Modelski 
states that each cycle begins with a period of weak system organization that 
ultimately dissolves into a global war. The result of such a global war is the
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emergence of one world power that is preponderant and thus able to dominate 
the system, and maintain systemic order. Ultimately, the dominant power looses 
ground relative to competitors, and eventually the system again disintegrates, 
resulting in global war (Modelski 1978: 217).
Modelski states that there have been five such cycles since the beginning 
of the modem world system: the period of domination by Portugal from 1494
through 1576-1580; domination by The Netherlands (United Provinces) from 
1609 through 1672-1678; a first period of British domination from 1713 through 
the late 1700s; a second period of British domination from 1815 through 1939; 
and a period of U.S. domination beginning in 1945 that has not yet ended. It 
must be noted that there is rather general, although not complete agreement among 
scholars as to these cited periods. There is no major dispute in the literature 
regarding the periods of domination or hegemony by The Netherlands, the second 
British period, or the U.S.period. However, Modelski himself notes that some 
scholars hold that the major power of the sixteenth century was Spain rather than 
Portugal (Modelski 1978: 219). Secondly, not all major scholars concerned with 
cycles and hegemonic stability identify the period that Modelski refers to as the 
first British period. Finally,as we have already seen, most scholars place the end 
of what Modelski refers to as the second British period much earlier than 1939. 
For Modelski, 1939 has to be considered as the end of the period due to the fact 
that,in his theoretical perspective, each period of domination must end with global 
war. In this context, Modelski holds that World Wars I and II were both part 
of the same basic global conflict that ended one world order, and began anew one 
in 1945.
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It should be noted that Modelski’s work is generally referred to as cycle 
theory rather than hegemonic stability theory. Another self-proclaimed "cycle 
theorist" Suzanne Frederick maintains that "a long-cycle perspective of world 
leadership leads to a different (but occasionally overlapping) interpretation of 
systemic power hierarchy" (Frederick 1987: 192). It is her contention that 
hegemonic leadership "is conceived of as predominantly economic in nature," 
whereas "the long cycle perspective proposes that minimum threshold levels of 
systemic political-military capability concentration have been required..." (Frederick 
1987: 193). While it is certainly true that hegemonic stability theory is basically 
economic in nature, it is definitely not the case that hegemonic stability theory 
does not hold that minimum militaiy thresholds are required. While it is true that 
some "cycle theorists," including Modelski, may deal somewhat more with military 
power than do hegemonic stability theorists, there is general agreement regarding 
basic military thresholds.
Modelski also undertakes a comparison of long cycle theory with hegemonic 
stability theory. He notes that there is indeed "considerable convergence" between 
the two approaches (Modelski 1987: 12). Nonetheless, it is his contention, that 
there are also significant differences. For example, he notes that while hegemonic 
stability theory posits a direct relationship between hegemony and the existence 
of free trade policies, this is not completely the case for the long-cycle 
perspective. In the latter perspective, a relationship between hegemony and free 
trade is posited, but the relationship is held to be more variable, depending upon 
specific conditions. This is, in fact, probably the largest difference between the 
two perspectives, and it certainly is of significance. Modelski also contends, as
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did Frederick, that the long-cycle perspective is more concerned with strategic 
concerns than is hegemonic stability theory.
Unfortunately, Modelski makes another comparison between hegemonic 
stability theory and long-cycle theory that is completely unfounded. He states 
that the long-cycle perspective, in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, is 
concerned
not just with leadership, but also with the challenges 
to leadership, and with the tension that inevitably 
arises between them —  a tension that imparts a 
dynamic quality to the entire process (Modelski 1987:
12 -13 ).
Hegemonic stability theory is, in fact, directly concerned with the challenge to 
leadership and the tension thus arising. Indeed, this challenge is one of the major 
factors that is held to result in a loss of hegemony.
As we have seen, to maintain that there are no relevant differences between 
hegemonic stability theory and the long-cycle perspective would be incorrect. 
Two differences may be clearly discerned: 1. The long-cycle perspective does
concentrate upon military and strategic matter somewhat more than does hegemonic 
stability theory. 2. The relationship between hegemony and free trade is less 
clear-cut in long-cycle theory than in hegemonic stability theory. The latter point 
is particularly important for the present work, as a statistical test of the 
relationship between hegemony and free trade appears in Chapter Three. Therefore, 
this must be considered as being directly a test of an important axiom of 
hegemonic stability theoiy, but not of long-cycle theory. Nonetheless, the results
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certainly will pertain to long-cycle theory, as the degree to which the relationship 
is present or not present is of concern here as well.
In conclusion, while there certainly are differences in the perspectives, the 
commonalities are also strong. Both are directly concerned with the rise and fall 
of hegemonic orders. Both identify, at the very least, specific periods of British 
and American hegemony, and both see many common conditions involved in the 
transition from hegemony to competition.
Perhaps most important of all, both maintain that the system will only be 
stable when one a hegemonic state is present. To try to force distinctions 
between the perspectives that simply do not exist, as Modelski and Frederick 
have both done, can only be dysfunctional in the long run.
Until the present, movement from hegemony to core competition, which 
may also be termed as movement along the unicentric-multicentric continuum, 
has coincided with the expansion and contraction of colonialism (Bergesen and 
Schoenberg 1980: 238). Colonialism has expanded when economic power has 
been held by a number of core states,without any one state being clearly 
predominant. Colonialism has contracted when one state has become predominant 
in the system; i.e. the hegemon. The British case of the nineteenth century serves 
as an excellent illustration of this point. Until the latter portion of the nineteenth 
century, Britain dominated the system, and established a free trade regime. 
Although some colonization did, in fact, take place during this period,the rate was 
rather gradual. As Britain’s power and the British-established free trade regime 
eroded, particularly after 1870, a scramble began among the core powers to carve 
up the remaining un colonized parts of the world. Thus, colonial empires were
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expanded rapidly during this period. Britain itself was a major player in this 
expansion, even adding an area as vast as India to its empire. By the end of the 
century, much of Africa and a substantial portion of Asia had been colonized.
With the ascendance of the U.S. as a hegemon in the post-W orld War II 
period, and with the advent of a new free trade regime, the gradual process of 
decolonization began. This process has now been almost completed.
The crux of the argument is that when the system is multicentric, it is 
inherently unstable, and states utilize colonization as a mechanism for regularizing 
their economic relations. For example, core states trading with their own colonies 
are not subject to the uncertainties and differential treatment of changing tariff 
policies. By contrast, when the system is dominated by a hegemon and a free 
trade regime is in place, conflict is minimized and economic transactions take place 
in a more stable environment. Linkages in the system between core and 
peripheral states are primarily economic, rather than explicitly political, as in the 
case of colonialism.
An important question that needs to be addressed is whether systems with 
declining hegemons will continue to be reshaped as colonial systems. Although 
the suggestion that this is the case is sometimes made, it seems rather unlikely 
given the present world order. In particular, the present balance between the 
Western Powers and the Eastern Bloc would seem to greatly mitigate the 
possibility of a return to colonialism (this will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
Five). A much more likely scenario is that as hegemony continues to erode, the 
world economy will come to be based more and more upon various particularistic 
trade agreements, with free trade thus becoming much less common. This has
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been the pattern the last several hundred years, although until the present it has 
been accompanied by waves of colonization. If the theory of hegemonic stability 
is correct, this will also mean that international trade will gradually decrease for 
the core states, as a percentage of aggregate national income.
In short, while for the last several hundred years movement from 
unicentricity to multicentricity has been accompanied by movement from 
core-periphery relations based on primarily economic linkages to relations based 
increasingly on colonial arrangements, it is quite possible that this will not be 
the case in the future. Instead, as we have discussed above, the changes may 
be simply in the form of the economic linkages. Nonetheless, the cycle of 
movement toward and away from colonialism is not generally viewed analytically 
as being the same as the movement from unicentricity to multicentricity; it is seen 
as a cycle resulting from the latter movement. Again, it must be emphasized that 
the argument regarding colonialism is advanced by the world systems theorists, not 
by such liberal theorists as Kindleberger and Keohane. For the latter, the focus is 
entirely upon the unicentricity/multicentricity continuum.
Differences
As is usually the case with regard to general theories, there are some 
differences among advocates of hegemonic stability theory as to some of the 
theory’s specifics. There is, of course, general agreement that a hegemon is needed 
in order to create and maintain an open international order (although Keohane, 
departing from the general theory, maintains that once the regimes to support an
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open international regime have been created, a hegemon may no longer be 
essential). Nonetheless, there are some notable differences among theorists, 
particularly with regard to the question as to the specific character of the role 
played by the hegemon.
As we have already seen, Kindleberger and Keohane both maintain that 
the hegemon performs a role that is beneficial to the world order in general. 
Kindleberger’s choice of the term "leadership" to describe the role taken by the 
hegemon is strongly indicative of this understanding. Nonetheless, Kindleberger 
himself notes that it is not always easy to distinguish leadership from exploitation 
(Kindleberger 1981: 248). Despite this, he maintains that the U.S. has generally 
assumed a leadership role rather than one of exploitation. He does suggest that 
from the end of World War II until 1960, "domination was inadvertently involved" 
(Kindleberger 1981: 248). Nonetheless, two important points need to be noted 
here. First, Kindleberger refers to any denomination present as being "inadvertent," 
although he does not spell out the specific forms of domination and does not 
indicate in what manner this domination was inadvertent. Secondly, although he 
admits that exploitation is possible, when discussing the American case he 
substitutes the term "domination" for "exploitation." Although he does not discuss 
this substitution, domination clearly has a less determinant meaning than 
exploitation. Some, but not all, domination includes exploitation. Finally, 
Kindleberger believes that by 1960, domination was not present in the U.S. role 
as "leader." (Kindleberger 1981: 248).
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Kindleberger does note that public goods are sometimes competitive with 
private goods. He cites U.S.management of the exchange standard from 1945 
to 1971 as such a case.This, he states,
can be viewed as provision of either the public good 
of international money, or the private good for itself 
of seignorage, which is the profit that comes to the 
seigneur, or sovereign power, from the issuance of 
money. Of course it can be both (Kindleberger 1981:
248).
Kindleberger argues that whatever surplus is gained by the hegemon in this manner 
may be seen as being a benefit gained in return for the disproportionate system 
maintenance costs bome by the hegemon (Kindleberger 1981: 248). His primary 
concern lies with the instances where the public good is underproduced due to the 
abundance of free riders, where "there is neither domination nor self-abnegation 
in the interest of responsibility" (Kindleberger 1981: 249). He believes that "the 
system is essentially unstable and subject to entropy" (Kindleberger 1981: 250). 
The leadership role may be threatened by the refusal of followers to go along, or 
due to the inability or unwillingness of the hegemon to pay the costs of system 
maintenance. In Kindleberger’s view, the latter will be brought about principally 
due to an increase of costs resulting from an increase in free riding (Kindleberger 
1981: 251).
Keohane is somewhat more direct than Kindleberger in acknowledging that 
some advantages do accrue to the hegemon. He draws a parallel here between 
the hegemon and an entrepreneur. In order for an entrepreneur to make a
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particular set of investments, he must be convinced that he will be able to gain 
more from the investments than merely than the value of the investments 
themselves. The promise simply of a social good is not sufficient. Keohane 
argues that a government, in effect acting as an entrepreneur, will have the same 
requirements. For example, a government "must expect to be able to gain more 
itself from the regime than it invests in organizing the activity" (Keohane 1982: 
339). Therefore, a hegemon is unlikely to carry out the stabilizing role for the 
system if the maintenance costs are greater than the perceived value of received 
benefits.
Despite the fact that Keohane is more explicit than Kindleberger in his 
discussion regarding benefits for the hegemon, his major concern for the system 
is virtually identical to that of Kindleberger. Keohane states that the big problem 
is that a situation is most likely to exist where
no potential entrepreneur is large relative to the whole 
set of potential beneficiaries, and where'free riders’ 
cannot be prevented from benefiting from cooperation 
without paying proportionately (Kindleberger 1982:
339).
This is the same as Kindleberger’s concern about the tendency of public goods 
to be underproduced relative to private goods due to the problem of free riding.
Robert Gilpin states that
Since the Industrial Revolution, the two successive 
hegemonic powers in the global system (Great Britain 
and the United States) have sought to organize
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political, territorial, and especially economic relations 
in terms of their respective security and economic 
interests (Gilpin 1981: 144).
He further states that the hegemonic power supplies public goods, particularly 
security, in exchange for revenue (Gilpin 1981: 144-145). It is thus clear that 
for Gilpin the primary motivation for the hegemon to stabilize the political 
economy is that this enhances its own economic and security positions. In this 
context he further notes that economic and technical transfers to developing 
countries are motivated primarily by political and military considerations rather 
than by the specific needs of the recipient countries (Gilpin 1981: 143). 
Nonetheless, Gilpin does not see the structural relationship between the hegemon 
and under developed societies as being detrimental to the latter to the same degree 
as do dependency theorists and world systems theorists. This will be discussed 
in greater detail below.
Stephen Krasner, like Kindleberger and Keohane, states that at the height 
of its power, the hegemonic state will disproportionately supply collective goods 
for the system. This supply will decline as the hegemon declines in power, relative 
to that of other states. Krasner notes that a declining power is less willing to 
sacrifice particular advantages in order to serve international principles and norms 
(Krasner 1985: 78). Nonetheless, this does not mean that Krasner sees the role 
of the hegemon as a benevolent one. For example, after stating that the U.S. was 
the primary force in creating the international organizations after World War II, 
he notes: "For a hegemonic power, the purpose of such organizations is to 
legitimate its preferences and values" (Krasner 1985: 10). Of course, such
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preferences and values need not, in all cases, run counter to the needs and 
preferences of other states. It is clear that most preferences and values will run 
counter to those of some states, and in support of those of others.
Krasner makes it completely clear that the international regimes that have 
been fostered by the U.S., in their present form, largely run counter to the 
interests of most less developed countries. It should further be noted that in 
may cases, the form of these regimes has been supported by most other 
industrialized countries, in addition to the U.S. Therefore, this is a case where 
the interests and preferences of the U.S. were generally in accord with those of 
other industrialized states, but contrary to those of less developed countries. 
Indeed, Krasner states that
Relations between industrialized and developing areas 
are found to be conflictual because most Southern 
countries cannot hope to cope with their international 
vulnerability except by challenging principles, norms, 
and rules preferred by industrialized countries (Krasner 
1985: 3).
We have already seen that world systems theorists describe a variance in the 
world system between periods when the distribution of power among core states 
is unicentric, with one hegemonic state, and periods when the distribution is 
multicentric. Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, and Albert Szymanski, state that 
when the system is unicentric, the role played by the hegemon allows other core 
states to avoid the overhead costs of maintaining stability in the system 
(Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977: 464; Szymanski 1973: 1 -1 4 ).
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Chase-Dunn and Rubinson summarize the world systems theory position 
on unicentricity v is -a -v is  system stability as follows:
Unicentric periods are characterized by relatively 
peaceful economic competition in a relatively integrated 
world economy supported by the institutional 
framework based on the hegemonic core state in 
international agreements (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 
1977: 464).
This is virtually identical to the role description of the hegemon, and the concept 
of unicentric stability, held by Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen 
Krasner. In fact, on a basic level, the general description of hegemony varies little 
between any of the aforementioned scholars, or between these scholars and world 
systems theorists. Their understandings of the operation of hegemony are nearly 
identical. This includes their work on the movement of the world system 
between unicentric and multicentric periods, the basic factors which cause this 
movement to take place, and the way in which the hegemon operates to stabilize 
the system. It is quite striking that this should be so, given the differences in 
perspective between these scholars, and particularly between these scholars and 
world systems theorists. The differences of perspective lie not in the descriptions 
of the operation of hegemony, but in the specific results of hegemony.
I will here summarize the basic perspectives of the scholars discussed above 
regarding hegemonic stability. As we have seen, Kindleberger and Keohane hold 
that more benefits accrue to a system with a hegemon than to a system without 
one. The general position is that all states will tend to benefit from this form
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of system organization, regardless of their level of development. This does not 
imply that all are affected in the same manner. For example, developed states 
are purported to pay more maintenance costs than others. Also, Keohane states 
that the hegemon does derive some benefits as a result of its particular role in 
the system. Nonetheless, benefits are said to accrue to all members of the system. 
For Krasner, the benefits are instead asymmetrical. Developed states tend to benefit 
somewhat at the expense of others under hegemony.
For world systems theorists, the modem world system in general is 
structured in a manner that benefits the core states to the detriment of the
peripheral states. This is true whether or not the system is dominated by a
hegemon. There is a cycle which moves from unicentricity to multicentricity, 
and back again. Under both unicentric and multicentric orders, the core states 
gain at the expense of the peripheral, and often the semi-peripheral, states. The 
difference between the forms of organization is that under hegemony, or 
unicentricity, the system is held to be more stable. There are fewer conflicts 
among core states, and trade is generally open.
In conclusion, all of the major theorists who discuss hegemonic stability
describe the operation of hegemony itself under the same basic terms. This is 
quite astounding, given the radically different perspectives the theorists represent. 
The basic conditions under which a hegemon will rise or fall are similar for all 
of these theorists. All maintain that the system will be most stable when there 
is a hegemon. Nonetheless, on the matter of who benefits, and to what extent, 
there are indeed deep divergences. This matter will be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter Five.
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A Case-Study Examination of Hegemonic Stability Theory
One of the problems in examining hegemonic stability theory is that there 
is no systematic data on the trade policies of states, in terms of the degree to 
which they are open or closed (this problem will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter Three). However, it is generally possible, through careful research, to 
determine the general commercial posture of individual states, or individual ports. 
One potentially promising way to test hegemonic stability is through such an 
analysis of the trade policies of specific states or ports over time. The trade
policies may then be viewed in terms of the extent to which the world system
is dominated by a hegemon. If the theory of hegemonic stability is correct, the 
commercial policies of the states or ports should be relatively open when the 
world system is dominated by a hegemon, and relatively restricted, or closed, 
when it is not.
An obvious problem with the method outlined above is that the results of 
such an analysis may not be generalized for the system as a whole, unless a 
rather large group of states or ports are included in the analysis. Unfortunately, 
this would indeed be quite a major task. Nonetheless, such a study, even of a
small group of states or ports, could provide a useful beginning, which could then
be followed with the application of the same method to the commercial policy of 
additional states or ports.
Fred Lawson has endeavored to undertake such a study. Specifically, Lawson 
set out to test the theory of hegemonic stability by examining the nineteenth
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century trade policies of three Arabian port-cities: Muscat, Aden, and Mocha.
Although he does not make it completely clear why he chose these three particular 
ports as the focus of his study, he does point out that all three were important 
trading centers between 1800 and 1905, with "extensive relations with European 
powers throughout this period” (Lawson 1983: 321). It is Lawson’s contention 
that the relationship between hegemony and free trade in the commercial affairs 
of these states was not what the theory of hegemonic stability (or the mercantilist 
perspective, as Lawson also calls it) suggests.
I will examine Lawson’s findings and conclusions for each of the three 
ports, beginning with the Omani port of Muscat. Lawson states that the years 
in which "an open international trading order operated around Muscat do not 
coincide with either period (see below) of British predominance in the area" 
(Lawson 1983: 322), offering the following summary of commercial affairs 
during the course of the 1800s: 1800-1825: years of British-Omani
condominium or perhaps indirect British predominance in the Arabian Sea 
accompanied by substantial controls on Oman’s foreign and domestic trade. 
1825-1845: years of persistent and growing challenges to Britain’s position in 
the area with some relaxation of commercial restrictions in Omani territories. 
1860-1885: years of considerably greater competition at Muscat among Western 
commercial powers associated with the gradual abandonment of trading controls 
and the granting of m ost-favored-nation status to virtually all foreign interests. 
1870-1885: years in which an open international trading structure was in place 
at Muscat. 1890-1905: years of growing British predominance and a gradual 
constriction of foreign commerce at the port.
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I will not question Lawson’s summary that is presented above, but rather 
his conclusions. His statement regarding British predominance in the area misses 
the point. By his own definition, hegemonic stability theory, or the mercantilist 
perspective, holds that
whenever there is no single clearly predominant power 
in the world but rather a number of different 
countries that are relatively equal in terms of economic 
capabilities and level of technological 
development...trade will be generally restricted and
states will tend to adopt a variety of more or less
protectionist measures in their dealings with each other 
(Lawson 1983: 317).
Herein lies a major discrepancy. Lawson considers openness in the mercantilist 
perspective to be predicated upon the existence of one clearly predominant power 
in the world. Yet, as we have seen, his analysis of the commercial policy of 
Muscat, as well as that of Aden and Mocha, is based upon changes in the periods 
of "British predominance in the area," not upon Britain’s position in the world 
relative to that of other powers. Lawson’s own definition of the mercantilist 
perspective is not based upon "predominance in the area," but rather upon 
predominance in the world. He does indeed provide substantial evidence that trade 
openness decreased as British predominance in the area increased, but this does not
run counter to the mercantilist perspective as he suggests.
I will briefly reexamine the trade policy of Muscat, utilizing the historical 
information presented by Lawson, but substituting Lawson’s own definition of
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the mercantilist perspective, rather than his later used concept of predominance 
in the area: 1800-1825. British power was increasing rapidly, but had not
reached the levels it would later in the century. Substantial controls remained on 
trade in the Omani territories. 1825-1845. British power was increasing relative 
to that of other major powers; some relaxation of commercial restrictions in 
Omani territories took place. 1860-1885. British power reached its height in 
this period (the period around 1870 is generally considered to have been the time 
at which British power reached its apex). An open trading structure was in place 
at Muscat. 1890-1905. British power began a gradual decline relative to other 
powers after the early 1870s, and by the early 1890s had lost substantial ground 
to other states, particularly the U.S., and France. A  gradual constriction of foreign 
commerce at the port took place.
The historical evidence presented by Lawson for Muscat thus may be 
interpreted as supporting the theory of hegemonic stability, rather than contradicting 
it. A t the height of British world power, an open trading structure was in place 
at Muscat. As British power in the world waned, Britain began restricting trade 
at the port, as it set up trade agreements that better served British interests, with 
much of the pervious British competitive advantage now gone.
Lawson’s analysis of the ports of Aden and Mocha produced results very 
similar to those for Muscat. He notes that from 1839 to 1850, there was 
"substantial restriction" on the commerce of Aden, despite strong British 
predominance. By contrast, he notes that in the period of 1850 to 1890, 
restrictions were gradually relaxed, although there were growing challenges to 
British predominance (Lawson 1983: 327-328). Again, the restrictions were
48
relaxed when British power was highest, at least in the period from 1850 to 
1870. In the case of Mocha, Lawson states that from 1820 to 1830, Britain 
dominated the port’s commercial affairs; sometimes restricting trade and sometimes 
opening it up. However, he states that from 1845 through 1880, years of 
renewed Western competition, the port maintained restrictive trade practices.
Lawson concludes that for both Aden and Mocha, as for Muscat, no 
relationship could be "found between the presence of a hegemonic power and the 
existence of an open trading structure..." (Lawson 1983: 328). It is true that for 
Aden, as well as for Muscat, the trading structure was indeed not open when the 
British presence in the area was strongest, but was generally open when British 
power in the world was greatest. Therefore, as was the case with Muscat, the 
trading policies of Aden seem to give support to the theory of hegemonic stability, 
rather than the contrary as Lawson suggests. By contrast, Lawson’s findings for 
Mocha do indeed seem not to be in accord with the theory. The trading structure 
was closed at the time when British power in the world was greatest.
Lawson sums up his findings as follows:
First, it does not appear that the presence of a 
predominant military-economic power is required in 
order for unrestricted commercial orders to be 
established or maintained. Free trading arrangements 
among countries do not seem to demand the existence 
of a strong actor willing and able to provide the 
collective goods that mercantilists claim are necessary 
if such orders are to function effectively. On the
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contrary, on the basis of the historical data reported 
here it seems considerably more likely that open 
trading structures will emerge under conditions of 
regional or global competition than that they will be 
associated with political hegemony (Lawson 1983:
330).
As I have shown through my reinterpretation of the trade information for 
three Arabian ports, Lawson’s assertion that open trading structures seem more 
likely to be in place where there is not hegemony is not wholly tenable on the 
basis of these cases. Indeed, the preponderance of evidence seems to run in the 
other direction; free trading structures were most often in place for the ports when 
British power in the world was greatest. Nonetheless, this reinterpretation of 
Lawson’s study does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that hegemonic 
stability theory is, in fact, correct in its most basic tenant; that free trade 
structures are most likely (or perhaps only possible) under hegemony. It does, 
however, provide sufficient evidence to conclude that Lawson’s findings are not 
in themselves a sufficient basis upon which to include that hegemonic stability 
theory is invalid. The data may be interpreted quite differently from Lawson’s 
interpretation. The evidence is inconclusive. Lawson’s work amply demonstrates 
the difficulties involved in determining through systematic means exactly what the 
relationship is between hegemonic power and system openness.
In Chapter Three I will discuss some of the basic predictions derived from 
hegemonic stability as to what affect the erosion of U.S. hegemony is likely to 
have on the international economy, particularly with regard to market openness.
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Also, some of the central aspects of the international trade regime in the post 
World War II world are discussed.
I
Chapter Three
In this chapter, I will consider the predictions of advocates of hegemonic 
stability theory with regard to the structure of the world economic order after 
the fall of a hegemon. As I have noted above, there are some noteworthy 
differences among the specific versions of hegemonic stability theory advocated 
by various theorists. As would be expected given this fact, predictions for the 
future based upon the utilization of hegemonic stability theory as a predictive 
tool vary considerably.
This chapter will also present a brief examination of U.S. international 
economic policy in the post World War II period, particularly with regard to the 
maintenance of an open international economic order. An understanding of the 
basic direction of U.S. international economic policy during this period is essential, 
not only in understanding the nature of American hegemony, but also to making 
predictions about the future of the international economic order.
Predictions of Hegemonic Stability Theorists for a Post-Hegemonic World
Robert Keohane (Keohane 1984: 9) and Robert Gilpin both point out that 
hegemonic powers have in each case been the result of a world war.1 For
1 Nonetheless, it is not the case that every major international war 
will result in the emergence of a new hegemon. World War I, for 
example, did not result in such an emergence. Nonetheless, it is sometimes 
maintained that the World War I and World War II were actually both part
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example, Great Britain became a hegemon only with the end of the Napoleonic 
wars. The U.S. became a hegemon after, and partly as a result of, World War 
II. Whether or not the U.S. could have, or would have, become a hegemon had 
World War II not occurred is a matter for scholarly debate. Nonetheless, it is 
doubtless the case that the U.S. would not have dominated the world political 
economy nearly so thoroughly as it did had the war not taken place. Certainly, 
the European powers would have remained as much larger and potent powers, 
particularly economic powers, during the period running roughly from the end of 
the war until the early 1970s, when the U.S. was predominant by a large margin. 
This, in turn, would have resulted in the U.S. not having been as readily able to 
shape the international economic order according to its own terms.
Robert Gilpin states that
Throughout history the primary means of resolving 
disequilibrium between the structure of the international 
system and the redistribution of power has been war, 
more particularly, what we shall call a hegemonic war 
(Gilpin 1981: 197).
A hegemonic war is one which drastically alters the relative standings of the 
powers in the international political/economic system. Gilpin ultimately concludes 
that it is not inevitable that the present world order will eventually disintegrate
of one protracted struggle for system realignment; utilizing this perspective, 
it could be argued that these wars together ultimately led to the emergence 
of a new hegemon. In this regard, it needs to be noted that World War
I played an important role in strengthening the position of the U.S. v is -  
a-v is the large European powers, although the U.S. did not emerge as a 
hegemon at the end of the war.
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into hegemonic war, although noting that it is certainly a strong possibility. 
While he does suggest that there are various factors that may serve to stabilize 
the system over the coming decades, he does not directly address the question of 
how stability may be maintained in the long-term  (Gilpin 1981: 234-244). 
After making a strong structural argument to demonstrate that hegemonic war has 
always been the major means of system adjustment, he suggests that this may be 
avoided, but does not make it at all clear how this might be accomplished.
Keohane argues that while there is some validity to the proposition that 
hegemony
can facilitate a certain type of cooperation, ... there is 
little reason to believe that hegemony is either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence 
of cooperative relationships (Keohane 1984: 31).
Indeed, Keohane maintains that a central tenant of hegemonic stability theory is 
erroneous, arguing that
...cooperation does not necessarily require the existence 
of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have 
been established. Post-hegemonic cooperation is also 
possible (Keohane 1984: 32).
This assertion represents an interesting twist in the conventional understanding 
of hegemonic stability theory. The phrase quoted above "...after international 
regimes have been established" is key in this context. Keohane is here asserting 
that cooperation can take place without the presence of a hegemon, but nonetheless
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maintains that this is the case only if international regimes have already been 
established. The clear implication is that such regimes may be established only 
through the leadership of a hegemon. Therefore, in Keohane’s version of the 
theory, a hegemon is necessary for the establishment, but not the maintenance, of 
cooperation.
Not surprisingly, given his version of hegemonic stability theory as stated 
above, Keohane believes that there is at least a possibility of continued cooperation 
in the world today. Despite the fact that the U.S. no longer serves as a 
hegemon, and despite his realization that no other nation is in a position to fill 
this role, he believes that the extent regimes may be a sufficient basis upon which 
cooperation may be continued.2
Of course, it is impossible to fully determine whether this is the case, except in 
hindsight, given that regimes, such as the extent international trade regime, may 
continue to work in the short term v is -a -v is  the maintenance of stability, but 
nonetheless gradually break down. It should be remembered in this context that, 
as I noted in Chapter Two, different regimes certainly may have an affect upon 
one another; thus, it may well take the maintenance of a number of regimes in 
order for stability to be maintained in any given issue area, such as the area of 
international trade.
2 For example, with regard to international trade, Keohane maintains 
that the presently existing international trade regime, incorporating 
components such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, may provide a sufficient basis 
upon which cooperation may be maintained. His assumption is that an 
open international economic policy would be a central result of such 
cooperation.
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Finally, two important points need to be made. First, as we have seen, 
regimes may be captured by various parties in order to serve aims that are quite 
different from those that were originally intended. Whether this is good or bad 
varies, of course, from case to case; generally the question of "good for whom?" 
must also be asked. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) initially was strongly supported by the U.S. 
The major powers, particularly the U.S., exercised a considerable degree of control 
over the policies of this organization. However, in recent years, the large group 
of non-aligned, less developed states in the United Nations have come to wield 
substantial influence over the direction of UNESCO policy. This change is viewed 
very positively by most of the less developed states, but very negatively by most 
of the more developed states. The Reagan Administration even went so far as 
to discontinue U.S. support for UNESCO due to its dissatisfaction with UNESCO 
policies resulting from the influence of less developed countries.
Second, while there may be regime lag due to inertia, such that regimes 
may outlast the structural conditions of the world political economy under which 
they were established, regime lag and regime perpetuation are two entirely different 
matters. The institutions and patterns of behavior established by a hegemon may 
linger for some time after the fall of a hegemon, but it is not clear how long 
they may last. Whether or not regimes may last in the long term without the 
presence of a hegemon remains an open question.
The views of Charles Kindleberger regarding a post-hegemonic world differ 
considerably from those of Keohane. Kindleberger, by contrast with Keohane, 
sees little possibility in there being a stable world political economy without one
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nation, the hegemon, acting as the stabilizer through the exercise of a "leadership" 
role. He briefly discusses several other potential bases of economic organization, 
but ultimately concludes that none of these forms are likely to work properly.
First, Kindleberger considers the possibility of the international system being 
stabilized through altruism on the part of the states. This, he concludes, is not 
tenable, principally due to the problem of free riding:
...unfortunately, the temptation to free ride is 
omnipresent, and when some critical number or 
proportion of countries yield to it, the production for 
the public good ceases (Kindleberger 1976: 19).
For example, in the present world, international monetary policy cannot be 
managed readily, due, in large part, to the extreme volatility of the international 
currency markets. Kindleberger argues that most countries are not willing to 
bear any of the costs of changing this situation. He thus concludes that the 
pressure of self-interest is ultimately too strong for countries, although particularly 
for poor countries (Kindleberger 1976: 20). As we saw in Chapter One, 
Kindleberger’s western bias is quite strong indeed.
Kindleberger also briefly discusses the possibility of the international system 
being organized on the basis of "enlightened self-interest," but concludes that this 
also cannot work, primarily due to states seeking short-term  advantage. Again, 
Kindleberger makes an implicit assumption that all states, including what he calls 
the poor states, should favor various principles of liberal economics, particularly 
free trade. Although he does not make the point directly, it is clear that in his 
view not to do so is act irrationally.
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Kindleberger further suggests the possibility of an "international economy 
managed by rules," but concludes that this form of organization will not work, 
principally for two reasons. There "may be difficulties: first in agreeing on
explicit rules or the content of the implicit rules, and second in their application 
to particular cases" (Kindleberger 1976: 22). Kindleberger also discusses the 
possibility of organization through regional blocs, citing, for example, the European 
Economic Community, but determines that this cannot work, primarily due to the 
fact that "the regional-bloc notion fails to take account of the world scale of 
economic issues" (Kindleberger 1976: 31). Kindleberger clearly is correct in this 
assertion.
Ultimately, Kindleberger determines that "leadership" is the only basis upon 
which the international political economy may be stabilized. He does suggest that 
there is an intuitive possibility of a multiple leadership, such as a tripartite 
leadership in the coming decades consisting of the U.S., West Germany, and Japan. 
In such an event, these countries would stabilize the system by "uniting their 
currencies by fixed exchange rates and coordinating monetary policies" 
(Kindleberger 1976: 36).
Nonetheless, Kindleberger states that this type of leadership is unlikely to 
work, for two reasons. First, the leader countries may have too much trouble 
coordinating policy with other powers; he cites France as an example of a power 
that may well prove difficult in terms of policy co-ordination. In all fairness, 
such problems could well be encountered with a number of states.
Second, the different members of the tripartite group would be too likely 
to pursue national interest -  private goods, at the expense of public goods. He
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therefore concludes that leadership by a single country, i.e. a system of hegemony 
(such as the system of American hegemony after World War II), is probably 
necessary in order for a system to be stable. Unfortunately, given this view, it 
is not at all clear to Kindleberger at what time another state will be both able 
and willing to serve as the leader. He ultimately concludes
Even if the emergence of a leader is slow, efforts to 
evolve a system of rules and organizations should not 
be, though their success is questionable. At the least, 
perhaps, one can prevent the old order from 
disintegrating completely, even though one cannot 
construct a strong new one (Kindleberger 1976: 38).
Stephen Krasner argues that the conditions that kept the system relatively 
stable in the 1960s cannot be recreated in the 1980s, due to the decline in 
American power relative to that of other states. He states that the decline of 
American power has two implications for the world economy. "First, the 
international order is becoming messier" (Krasner 1982: 30). General norms 
and rules no longer serve as the basis for many decisions. Instead, behavior is 
often according to ad hoc calculations of interest. Second, the system is more 
fragile; it is less able to absorb unexpected shocks. For example, no state now 
functions as a lender of last resort (Krasner 1982: 30). This function was 
exercised by the U.S. until the early 1970s. Krasner further notes that even if 
all of the states in a multipolar world believe it is in their best interest to 
maintain an open regime, they may still not be willing to pay the costs of 
maintenance. Particularly when a shock occurs in the system, such as the shock
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resulting from the 1973 OPEC oil boycott, states are too likely to work to secure 
their own short-term  interests (Krasner 1982: 30). Nonetheless, Krasner 
maintains that the system is not necessarily doomed to collapse (Krasner 1982: 
31).
U.S. Economic Policy Post World War II
In order to comprehend the current state of the international political 
economy, it is essential to understand the basic direction of U.S. economic policy 
after World War II.
The two paramount goals of American international 
economic policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
were the economic reconstruction of Western Europe 
and Japan and the formation of an open international 
economic order premised on liberal economic principles 
(Rapkin and Avery 1982: 5).
The U.S. set about putting in place the institutions it believed could serve to 
stabilize the international political economy in a manner in accord with its 
perceived interests. Of course, the dominant ideology among American decision­
makers was such that they maintained that the American world vision was in the 
best interest not only of the U.S., but in the world at large. The institutions 
thus established included, most importantly, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), and the International Monetary 
Fund. The IMF was originally designed to help countries overcome short term
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balance of payments difficulties. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, as its name implies, was originally designed to provide capital to 
facilitate long term reconstruction and development (specifically in Europe). 
Ultimately both of these institutions came to serve purposes rather different from 
their initial missions. The IMF is heavily involved to loans to less developed 
countries that have financial problems that cannot by any stretch of the 
imagination be described as being short term balance of payments difficulties. The 
World Bank never was provided with sufficient funds to provide for the 
reconstruction and development of post World War II Europe. Highly 
industrialized countries were major clients of the bank until the mid 1960s 
(Krasner 1985: 142), but the major clients since that time have been less
developed countries. It is clear that even from the first the international economic 
institutions pushed by the U.S. after the end of the second world war did not 
work in accord with their designs. Nonetheless, the U.S. had such an
overwhelming economic advantage over the w ar-tom  European states that it was 
still in a position to determine the basic t°rms under which the international 
economic order would operate, particularly v is -a -v is  the question of openness. 
The inability of the World Bank to foster the reconstruction of Europe eventually 
led to the advent of the Marshall Plan.
William Avery and David Rapkin note that the creation and maintenance 
of an open international economic order, promoting the free movement of goods 
and capital, itself served to greatly increase interdependence. They conclude that 
"...the effects of interdependence on the United States have been inversely related 
to the extent of its dominance of the international economic system (Avery and
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Rapkin 1982: 5). It is important to consider that the hegemon establishes a 
system over which it never has anything close to complete control.
In Chapter One, it is indicated that in order for the system to be 
maintained, the hegemon ultimately requires the support of additional powers. 
In particular, the support of strong secondary powers, such as West Germany, 
France, Great Britain, and Japan, in today’s world, is essential. Additionally 
compliance is needed among a number of smaller states. However, it has already 
been noted that an order, once established, takes on its own dynamics, many of 
which may not be in accord with the intentions of the hegemon. Other states, 
of course, are even less in a position to have the order be even close to a direct
reflection of their particular preferences. Thus there is clearly a circular
relationship between the states and the order that they form. The collective 
actions of the states, and particularly those of the hegemon, form and maintain 
the order. However the order, due to its great complexity, may not be completely 
controlled, and thus it, in turn, acts back upon the individual states, constraining 
and partially shaping their behaviors. Additionally, it has already been noted that 
international regimes may be purposively co-opted for particular purposes that are 
different from those for which they were initially designed. Certainly, for
example, the U.N. General Assembly serves a far different purpose than that which 
the U.S. and other major powers initially intended, particularly due to the
increased influence of less developed countries in that body.3
Avery and Rapkin note that
3 Nonetheless, the major powers are still able to wield considerable 
control over U.N. policy, particularly effective policy, through the use of 
Security Council veto powers.
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...the United States, as the country with the largest 
economy, and as the most prosperous and most 
competitive member of the system, had the greatest 
stake in long-term  stability and order and, hence, also 
the greatest incentive to invest in and sacrifice for the 
creation and maintenance of a stable and open 
international regime (Avery and Rapkin 1982: 9).
After World War II, the United States sometimes undertook policies that sacrificed 
short term gains in the name of long term stability. It was believed that such 
a policy would be most advantageous in the long term interests of the U.S., in 
security and economic terms. The Marshall plan is perhaps the most important 
policy implemented upon the basis of this reasoning. Another example is 
American acceptance of the protectionist stance of Japan, at a time when the U.S. 
was the world’s major advocate of free trade. It was understood that Japan 
would be unable to develop without its domestic market being protected against 
the importation of more efficiently produced goods from the U.S. and Europe. 
Therefore, the short term profit interests were subordinated to long term factors.
It is clear that American policymakers are now less willing to sacrifice 
short term interests. U.S. economic policy is now oriented much more strongly 
toward matters related to short term, primarily domestic interests, than was the 
case in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, almost all major decisions regarding 
American fiscal policy are now made on the basis of domestic considerations; this 
is quite different from the situation when the U.S. was serving as a lender of last 
resort in the preceding decades.
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As the U.S. has lost economic ground relative to other core states, 
particularly in terms of the balance of trade and aggregate size of the economy, 
the U.S. has gradually moved to a stance where it often violates its previously 
held principles of a liberal economic order, particularly with regard to trade policy. 
Specifically, tariffs have been enacted against the importation of a number of 
goods that threaten domestic firms. Additionally, the use of import quotas is 
becoming more commonplace.
It is important to realize that the systemic factors that lead to the decline 
of hegemonic states are largely resultant from the policies of the hegemonic states 
themselves. In particular, the hegemon undertakes policies which serve to diffuse 
its production technologies throughout the system. This in turn serves to erode 
the dominant economic position of the hegemon. Ironically, in this manner the 
open international order created by the hegemon serves as an instrument of its 
demise. Further, for both Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United 
States in the twentieth century, the failure to invest sufficiently in physical plant 
modernization played a major role in the erosion of hegemony.
Direct Foreign Investment
Direct foreign investment has figured prominently in the economic strategy 
of the United States since World War II. The U.S. has increasingly relied upon 
direct foreign investment for purposes of meeting foreign competition, earning 
foreign exchange, and solving domestic economic problems (Gilpin 1975: 8). The 
use of direct foreign investment has major implications, both for the maintenance
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of hegemony, and for the degree to which international trade is likely to increase 
or decrease.
As Robert Gilpin notes, an essential question which must be asked is 
whether the U.S. is repeating a major error made by other, once great economic 
powers, such as The Netherlands in the seventeenth century and Great Britain in 
the nineteenth, "...of overinvesting abroad to the detriment of the home economy?" 
(Gilpin 1975: 8). As I will discuss below, the large-scale use of direct foreign 
investment by U.S. -  headquartered firms after World War II represents a major 
difference from the British investment pattern during the period of British 
hegemony. This is significant, because it means that there is a substantial 
difference in this context between the organization of the international political 
economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the last period before 
the present witnessing the fall of a hegemon, and the present international political 
economy. As I discuss in Chapter Five, this may be an important factor in 
determining the prospects for the decline or continuation of an open international 
order.
International investments made by corporations based in other countries 
take two major forms: portfolio investments and direct foreign investment.
Portfolio investments are investments in which the investing firm makes equity 
investments in other firms, where the amount of the investment is not sufficient 
to give the investing firm a controlling interest, or makes various types of loans 
to foreign firms. In each case, control over the firms receiving the investment 
or loan remains with those firms. In the case of direct foreign investment, the 
investing firm either begins a new subsidiary in a foreign market, with the parent
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firm holding controlling interest, or purchases controlling interest in a firm that 
is already in existence. Of key importance here is the question of control; with 
direct foreign investment, control is held by the parent company. Therefore, the 
ability of the governments of the host countries to regulate those firms is much 
more limited than would be the case if controlling interest were held within the 
host country. For example, it is quite difficult for the government of a host 
country to exercise sufficient control over repatriation of profits. In general, 
regulation of multinational corporation subsidiaries in peripheral countries is made 
difficult due to the fact that there is often an implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
threat that the company will relocate if it does not get its way. This threat may 
carry substantial weight in countries that are actively engaged in seeking foreign 
investment. Obviously, there are specific types of cases where this threat is not 
particularly strong; situations where there are certain national endowments that 
make corporate operation in a country particularly desirable (such as specific 
natural resources), or an unusually strong internal market.
Although Great Britain did make some direct investments in the nineteenth 
century, the majority of its investments were in the form of portfolio investments 
and loans. The large international banks based in London were at the center of 
the greatest portion of British investments. In general, direct foreign investment 
was much less common in the nineteenth century than has been the case in this 
century, particularly since the end of World War II. The growth of direct foreign 
investment has been strongly tied to the development of technology. Direct 
foreign investment became practical for many concerns only with the advent of 
rapid transportation and communications, making it possible for a firm
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headquartered in a given country to coordinate even the d ay -to -day  operations 
of subsidiaries around the world.
Gilpin notes that by the early 1970s, direct foreign investment accounted 
for more international economic exchange for the U.S. than did exports (Gilpin 
1975: 17). In 1969, the foreign subsidiaries or U.S. based multinational 
corporations produced approximately $140 billion worth of goods, more than the
entire production of goods of any other country except the U.S. and the Soviet
Union (Gilpin 1975: 18).
While it is true that direct foreign investment has become an increasingly 
common form of investment for core countries in general, until quite recently it 
has particularly been favored by U.S.-based firms. Portfolio investments continue 
to represent a larger portion of overall foreign investment for corporations based 
outside of the U.S, than is the case for U.S. based corporations. Nonetheless, this 
probably will not be the case in the near future, as many foreign concerns are 
engaging in increasingly high levels of foreign direct investment. Indeed, a number 
of European firms, particularly ones headquartered in Great Britain, West Germany, 
and France, and Japanese firms, are now regularly making large-scale direct 
foreign investments in the United States. The increasing use direct foreign 
investment by corporations based outside the U.S. is certainly one of the most 
significant global economic trends of the past decade. Perhaps most importantly, 
the global increase in the use of direct foreign investment has acted as a major 
catalyst in increasing global interconnectedness.
It is important to note that the largest portion of direct foreign investment
is in the form of investments by one highly developed state in another highly
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developed state. Obviously, this type of direct foreign investment is generally 
undertaken for different reasons than is the case for core investment in peripheral 
countries. Labor costs in all core countries are high, so investment will generally 
not be for this purpose. Japan, for example, now receives little investment due 
to labor advantages, with it now being a full core member, whereas such 
investment was common there twenty years ago. Instead, the major purpose is 
to manufacture goods, or provide services for the well-developed internal markets 
of the countries themselves, or to given regions. Corporate subsidiaries are 
considered as being domestic enterprises in the countries in which they are located. 
Therefore, goods produced by those subsidiaries are not subject to tariffs in the 
host country. The advantages accrued by a corporation by locating in a particular 
area may be particularly strong where there are tariff exemptions that extend 
beyond one given country. For example, there is a major advantage in many 
U.S. corporations establishing at least one manufacturing facility in Europe. Goods 
produced within the European Economic Community nations may be moved from 
member to member without being subject to the higher tariffs to which they 
would be subjected were they coming from outside. The result of this is that the 
location of a plant in any member nation provides access to a huge market with 
reduced barriers. This is one of the chief benefits to core countries of the 
maintenance of a free trade regime.
Direct foreign investment in peripheral countries represents roughly one- 
third of all foreign direct investment. It is important to recognize that in most 
cases, direct foreign investment represents a substantially larger portion of aggregate 
economic activity for peripheral countries than is the case for core countries.
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Also, we have already noted that it is generally particularly difficult for the 
governments of peripheral countries to regulate multinational corporation 
subsidiaries. In some cases the multinational corporation, taken as a whole, has 
greater annual revenue than the entire gross national product of the country in 
which it has a subsidiaiy. For all of these reasons, multinational corporations 
may often wield substantially more control over peripheral countries than is the 
case with regard to less developed countries. This is a major point of contention 
for a number of less developed countries.
Industrial Decline
It is important to consider the question of why a hegemon eventually loses 
many of the advantages that are central to hegemonic ascendance. I have already 
noted that some decline of the U.S. economic position relative to that of other 
powers was virtually inevitable in the past few years, given the result of the 
European economies gradually recovering after World War II. Nonetheless, both 
Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth 
century, made decisions (or did not act at all) that had extremely negative 
ramifications for their economies, and that served to hasten their relative decline.
Initially, a hegemonic power has a huge lead as a result of its technological 
advantages. However, in time, other core states are able to develop more 
advanced physical plants and infrastructures. In many cases they are able to do 
so utilizing technology diffused from the hegemon as the base. The steel industry 
provides one of many excellent examples. After World War II, the U.S. steel
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industry, with its more efficient production, rapidly outstripped the performance 
of the British steel industry. The British plants were considerably older and less 
advanced than their American counterparts. Therefore, it was easy for U.S. firms 
to sell steel below the cost of British firms. It has often been remarked that 
Britain was extremely unfortunate not to have had more steel plants destroyed 
during World War II; this would have necessitated the building of new plants, 
which would doubtless have taken advantage of technological advances. By 
contrast, The Japanese steel capacity was largely destroyed in the war. As a 
result, it gradually rebuilt the industry utilizing technological advancements. This 
is a clear case where the diffusion of technology from the hegemon ultimately led 
to the relative decline of one of the hegemon’s industries. A central
problem for the most highly developed states is that the amount of fixed capital 
is so high that there is substantial resistance to mass replacement. Business 
interests, particularly in the U.S., have a strong tendency to base decisions upon 
a short, rather than a long, term calculus. Under such a calculus, diversification 
tends to be favored over plant modernization. This has been one of the major 
causes of the U.S. losing ground to other countries in the exportation of goods. 
Nevertheless, this problem is present to at least some degree in all countries; it 
merely has been more sever in some countries than in others. This factor 
probably has not served to reduce the overall level of international trade, since 
one country’s loses tend to be balanced by other country’s gains.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Tokyo Round
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Before proceeding to a test of hegemonic stability theory, the general
direction of recent international trade policy needs to be addressed. In particular, 
what is the likely result of recent international trade policy in terms of market 
openness? I will begin with a brief discussion of The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (G ATT), which is the most important coordinator of
international trade policy.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was one of the cornerstones 
upon which the post World War II international economic order was built.
GATT, as originally drafted in 1946 was primarily an attempt to lower tariffs. 
This was a response to the high tariffs that were enacted in the 1930s (de C. 
Grey 1982: 7). In general, tariffs were successfully lowered in accordance with 
GATT provisions. Nevertheless, GATT has not worked completely in the manner 
originally intended. The drafters of GATT apparently did not recognize the extent 
to which lowered tariffs would be replaced by other mechanisms designed to limit 
competition from foreign goods. The increasing emphasis of the U.S. upon "fair 
trade," beginning especially in the early 1970s, was aimed at such limitations. The 
anti-dumping provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a direct example of 
the implementation of policy on the basis of a "fair trade" doctrine (de C. Grey 
1982: 7).
The Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations, held in 1973, with 
nearly one hundred nations participating, had an important impact upon policies 
regarding international trade policy. At the meetings, a declaration calling for 
renewed efforts to remove impediments to international trade was approved. The 
declaration asserted that the participating nations would work to secure "the
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expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world trade." This was to be 
accomplished through tariff reductions and through weakening other policies that 
served to give unjustified protection to domestic producers (Quinn and Slayton 
1982: XV).
The Tokyo Round declaration is heavily based upon a system of contingency 
protection. For example, under the Tokyo Round Code on Subsidies and 
Countervailing duties, there are two provisions presented to enable governments 
to deal with subsidies of other governments. The first states that a country may 
offset subsidies on foreign goods through the use of countervailing duties. The 
second enables country’s to file complaints with the code’s Committee of 
Signatories in order either to have the subsidy changed, or to give a right to take 
retaliatory measures against its negative effects (Barcelo III: 121). The fact that 
the countiy’s participating in the Tokyo negotiations found these provisions to be 
necessary is in itself a tacit admission that there have been major breaks the free 
trade regime.
GATT tariff Reductions apply principally to manufactured goods. Many 
agricultural goods are either not covered, or at least are not covered fully. This 
has been and remains a major point of contention between the wealthy countries 
of the North and the poor Southern countries (Rangarajan 1984: 137, 138). The 
trade preferences of poor countries often run exactly opposite to those of the 
wealthy countries in this regard; they wish to have there be more protections 
against manufactured goods, but less against primary commodities, as their exports 
tend to be principally primary commodities. Import duties in the rich countries
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are usually zero for unprocessed material, but increase sharply in accordance with 
the degree to which the material is processed (Rangarajan 1984: 141).
N on-Tariff Barriers
The principles of GATT continue are being undermined more and more 
by the use of various non-tariff mechanisms, or barriers. A non-tariff barrier 
may be defined as
any measure (public or private) that causes 
internationally traded goods and services, or resources 
devoted to the production of these goods and services,
to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential
real world income. Potential real world income is 
that level attainable if resources and outputs are 
allocated in an economically efficient manner (Baldwin 
1970: 5).
In recent years, GATT principles have particularly been undermined by the 
increasing use of various "voluntary restraints" or quotas. A good example of
such a "voluntary restraint" is Japan’s so-called voluntary restraint on the export
of cars to the U.S.; a result of strong American pressure. This runs directly 
counter to GATT provisions which disallow any quotas on imports from specific 
countries. It would appear that, taken together, the increased use of non-tariff 
barriers would serve to decrease international trade.
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The steel industry provides a good example of an industry which has 
increasingly been subjected to non-tariff import controls by the U.S. in late 
1983, the U.S. steel concerns persuaded the Reagan administration to impose an 
import ceiling of 20 percent of the 100 million ton market for approximately 
twenty varieties of steel. At that time, imported steel accounted for roughly 
twenty-seven percent of the metal sold in the U.S. The U.S. then proceeded to 
get tw enty-nine exporters to accept quotas roughly proportionate to their recent 
share of total U.S. sales, by threatening to file various anti-dumping and anti­
subsidy suits. Such "voluntary restraint agreements" (VRAs) now cover 
semiconductors, automobiles, textiles, machine tools, clothing, and sugar, in addition 
to steel (Peter Passell 1988).
In conclusion, there is a trend in international trade policy that is not in 
accordance with a liberal international economic order. According to hegemonic 
stability theory, this is the direct consequence of the decline of the hegemon, in 
the present case, the U.S. Taken together, VRAs and other non-tariff mechanisms 
should serve to depress the level of international trade, or, at the very least, 
should depress the level of increase of international trade. Whether or not 
mechanisms that have been put in place are, in fact, sufficient to cause trade levels 
to decline in absolute terms will be addressed in Chapter Five.
In the following chapter, I will first discuss some of the problems involved 
in testing the central premise of hegemonic stability theory, that the decline of 
hegemony leads to a decline in system openness. I will then present a statistical 
test of this premise.
Chapter 4
Before undertaking an examination of the international economic system, it 
is essential to determine what does, and what does not, constitute this system. 
Specifically, is all international commerce regarded as taking place within a single 
system? With this regard, most political economists draw a sharp distinction 
between a capitalist trading system, and a trading system of states with 
command-based, or centralized economies.1 The communist states comprise the 
states in this latter category. There is a reasonable justification for this distinction, 
at least v is -a -v is  certain issue areas. Communist states have generally followed 
a strategy of removing themselves from the international trading system (aside 
from trade among themselves, particularly in the form of trade among CMEA 
members). What trade does take place with other states represents a 
comparatively small portion of the aggregate economic activity of the communist 
states. This situation continues to the present, although some states, such as 
Hungary, are gradually beginning to become more highly integrated into the 
capitalist international trading system, with more trade taking place. Nonetheless,
1 This is the only distinction that political economists generally draw 
between countries in terms of global trading systems. Reference is 
sometimes made to specific bloc trading systems, such as the European 
Economic Community or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but 




the effect of these states on the trading policy of the major core states remains 
relatively minor.
It must further be remembered that Hegemonic Stability Theory is 
particularly concerned with the matter of market openness. The purpose of 
market openness is to facilitate trade operating on the basis of a "free market" 
structure. This is entirely different from the basis upon which trade decisions 
are made in states with command-based economies. Most of the trade decisions 
in these states are made on the basis of long-term planning and are executed by 
governmental agreements. Therefore, the communist states are not included in the 
statistical analysis that is presented in this chapter.
The Determination of System Openness
Trade controls including, but not limited to, tariffs, and the question as to 
how much impact these trade controls actually have on international trade, are of 
paramount importance to hegemonic stability theory. Indeed, the central premise 
of hegemonic stability theory is that openness will increase with the ascendence 
of a hegemon, and will decrease with the decline of a hegemon. In this chapter, 
I present an operationalization of hegemony. Next I present a measure to 
determine the degree to which the level of hegemony affects the levels of 
international trade for industrialized countries. In order to proceed, it is necessary 
to establish exactly what constitutes market openness on a functional level.
On a historical basis, "openness" is used to describe a period when tariffs 
are substantially lowered. It is assumed that, all things being equal, lowered
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tariffs will result in increased trade. However, as Stephen Krasner has noted, 
tariffs alone are not a good indicator of structure (Krasner: 1976: 324). Other 
factors are also important. Various non-tariff barriers to trade can substitute for 
duties. For example, product quotas serve as impediments to trade. Also, an 
undervalued exchange rate may serve to make imports too expensive and therefore 
work as a protective mechanism for the domestic market.
Even if one is able to determine the specific level of tariffs does not by 
itself allow one to determine the degree to which trade will be facilitated or 
impeded. Tariffs do not have to be high in all cases in order to be effective. 
Where factor costs are similar, even an extremely low tariff may be a major 
impediment to trade. On the other hand, where factor costs are greatly dissimilar, 
even a tariff well of 100% may have little affect. This is discussed more fully 
in Chapter Five. Raymond Vemon has argued that tariffs, more than ever, are 
now a poor indicator of trade:
With the tariffs reduced to tolerable levels, the 
ascendant problems in the 1970s included the 
proliferation of public subsidies in all their obvious 
and subtle forms: governments’ demands on selected 
enterprises (usually foreign owned) in their territories 
that the enterprises should limit their imports and 
increase their exports, the procurement practices of 
state entities, and the unilateral application of quotas 
by importing countries (Vemon 1982: 482).
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Further, it should be noted that there are no reliable sources that systematically 
report tariff data over a significant period of time. The same is true with regard 
to product subsidies and quotas. Therefore, the use of tariffs or subsidies as the 
basis for a measure of system openness would not be tenable.
Krasner suggests that because of the problems outlined above, a behavioral 
measure might be a better indicator of openness. He advocates the use of trade 
proportions for this measure: the ratios of trade to national income for different 
states. The world economy may be said to be increasingly open when these 
ratios are increasing across time for most states (Krasner 1976: 324). This 
measure has an important advantage over other potential measures. Even were 
accurate systematic data on tariffs, trade subsidies, quotas, etc. available, this data 
would not of itself be sufficient to provide a basis for the a determination of 
whether the international trading system is structured in a manner that facilitates 
international trade. The important question is whether the degree to which 
openness is maintained is sufficient for international trade levels to increase, or, 
at the very least, not to decrease.
Despite the substantial scholarly attention devoted to the theory of hegemonic 
stability, little has been done to date in terms of systematically testing it. Most 
of the work to present has instead focused upon theoretical discussions of the 
workings of the world political economy under hegemonic control (see Gilpin 
1981; Keohane 1980, 1984). Even Stephen Krasner, who has suggested the use 
of specific behavioral measures in the analysis of hegemonic stability, has not 
undertaken a systematic statistical test of the theory.
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It is entirely possible that the relationship among the factors theoretically 
associated with openness, and system openness itself, will be found not to be 
statistically significant. This in itself would be an important finding, as it would 
indicate that hegemonic stability theory is incorrect in its most basic premise. At 
the very least, it would provide empirical evidence that, even if the premise is 
correct, the lag time is quite considerable.
Due to the fact that hegemonic stability theory is most concerned with 
preponderance of economic power, the inclusion criteria for states to be examined 
in this analysis are based upon two important economic factors: per capita GNP 
and aggregate GNP (with the exception that states with centrally planned 
economies have been omitted from the analysis). The countries used were those 
with the highest average per capita GNPs throughout the years included in the 
analysis, with the following exceptions:
1. Very small states with high GNPs, such as Luxembourg and Lichtenstein, 
were omitted, as their overall effect on the world political economy is small.
2. States that are not highly industrialized that have high per capita GNPs due 
to the sale of a single commodity (specifically oil), such as Saudi Arabia, were 
omitted. The larger population states included in this analysis also have the 
largest aggregate GNPs of all countries. Additionally, all of the smaller population 
states that are included are among the largest states in terms of aggregate GNP 
(though behind the large population states in the analysis) due to their large per 
capita GNPs. Nonetheless, there are a few states that are not included due to 
their lower per capita GNPs, that do have larger aggregate GNPs than the smaller
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states that are included. Specifically, smaller states that are included are Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, Australia, and Austria.
Spain is an example of a state with a relatively large aggregate GNP, that 
was not included due to its relatively low per capita GNP. Italy must also be 
noted in this context, as it presents a special case. During the years included in 
the analysis, Italy, although classified as a highly industrialized country, had a 
decidedly smaller per capita GNP than the other states that were included.
Nonetheless, its per capita GNP was decidedly larger than that of any of the other 
states that were not included (excluding the very small states such as Lichtenstein 
that were omitted). It was decided not to include Italy, due to the large 
difference in per capita GNP level. Indeed, this difference remains currently, with 
Italy’s per capita GNP currently being approximately three thousand dollars lower 
than that of any of the states that are included.
In addition to the United States, the following countries are included in 
the analysis (each country is followed by a listing of its national currency): 
Australia (dollar), Austria (Schilling), Belgium (Franc), Canada (Dollar),
Denmark (Kroner), Finland (Markkaa), France (Franc), Great Britain (Pound), 
Japan (Yen), The Netherlands (Guilder), Norway (Kroner), Sweden (Kronor), 
Switzerland (Franc), and West Germany (M ark).
Data and Operationalizations
The data source for this analysis is the International Financial Statistics
Yearbook, published by the International Monetary Fund. This is generally
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considered to be one of the most accurate sources for general international 
financial statistics, including trade statistics. Indeed, the collection of such data 
is one of the central functions of the IMF. The years for which data are included 
are 1957 through 1983. These are the dates for which continuous data are 
available in the 1985 edition of the International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
In the 1988 edition, 1983 is still the last date for which all of the data are 
available for all of the countries included in this analysis (the 1983 edition is 
used here because it includes continuous data for dates beginning three years earlier 
than the 1988 edition). This span of time is excellently suited for a test of 
hegemonic stability theory. In 1957 the U.S. was firmly in place as the 
hegemonic power. By the early 1970s, the U.S. had lost its position as hegemon; 
thus, by 1983, at least ten years had elapsed with the U.S. no longer being in 
the role of the hegemon.2 Further, the U.S. loss of position had continued 
during this period.
It is important that the levels of trade be calculated as a proportion of 
national income for each state, because without the inclusion of aggregate economic 
activity, highly spurious results might ensue. For example, a severe drop in trade 
for a given state in a given year may be interpreted as indicating that there is 
increased restriction of trade. However, the drop in trade may be due to a 
different factor, such as a national recession resulting in a general decrease in the
2 There is not complete agreement among scholars as to exactly when 
U.S. hegemony ended; this is not at all surprising, as hegemony lies on 
a continuum, rather than having absolute thresholds. Nonetheless, most 
scholars agree that the period of clear U.S. hegemony ended in the early 
1970s. Many scholars pinpoint 1971 as the specific year, citing the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary accord as the breaking point.
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level of economic activity, including trade. Therefore, ratios of trade to national 
income are an excellent measure for the present purposes. They offer the 
advantage of allowing the international trade states to be examined, while 
controlling for the effects of short-term  domestic factors. This will constitute the 
dependent variable.
The independent variable will be the distribution of potential economic 
power among the core states. Three state attributes will be used as a measure 
of state power. These are aggregate economic size, per capita Gross National 
Product, and relative share of core states’ trade. Aggregate economic size must 
be included, as it is one of the major determinants of the extent to which a state 
may influence the world political economy. It is important to note in this 
context that some of the most highly developed states, such as Switzerland, are 
rather small in terms of aggregate economic size, particularly in relation to the 
larger core powers. Per capita income is extremely important, because it is 
generally considered to be the best single measure of the level of economic 
development of a state (certain oil producing nations that currently have high 
levels of per capita GNP are an exception to this, but this is a rare anomaly 
historically). Share of core states’ trade is a crucial factor, as the rise or fall of 
the hegemon’s share is a major determinant of how the hegemon will act with 
v is -a -v is  trade policy, particularly with regard to matters of system openness or 
restrictedness. The three independent variables are used separately, with one 
equation for each variable, as they are all three more highly correlated with one 
another than with the dependent variable; thus there is a major multicollinearity 
problem combining the three in a single equation.
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Although no measure of military power will be included in the statistical 
analysis, it needs to be remembered that the U.S. remained by far the predominant 
Western military power throughout the years under consideration. This 
predominance of military power is held to be a necessary, though not solely 
sufficient for hegemony to be maintained.
In each case, the economic power attribute will be expressed as a ratio of 
the American value to the next highest (or highest, where applicable), expressed 
as a percentage. The American value will be used as the baseline here, because 
it is with the economic power of the U.S. (the hegemon) relative to that of the 
other major core powers with which we are concerned for the period following 
World War II. However, in a few cases, the U.S. value will not be the highest. 
In later years included in the analysis, the U.S. did not have the highest per capita 
income of the industrialized nations. This itself is one major indication of the 
decline of hegemony.
In the International Financial Statistics Yearbook many of the statistics 
are given only in national currency units for each country; only select statistics 
are presented in U.S. dollars. For example, gross national product figures for 
each country are given in the respective national currency units. Indeed, there 
is currently no data source which systematically reports GNP for all of the core 
countries in time series in U.S. dollars. Obviously, it is necessary to work with 
figures that are all based upon a single monetary standard. Since various figures 
for the U.S. are used in all parts of the present analysis due to the U.S. role as 
the hegemon, it was most practical to convert all figures to U.S. dollars. Of 
course, the rates of currency conversion vary over time. Indeed, they may change
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from day to day. Needless to say, it is not practical to use a different conversion 
factor for each day. Indeed, even international agencies such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund do not find this to be a practical approach. The 
International Monetary Fund provides average rates of exchange for each year. 
Therefore, in the analysis, a different conversion rate was used for each country, 
for each year that is included.
For all of the countries included in the analysis other than Australia and 
Great Britain, the International Financial Statistics Yearbook supplies figures in 
period averages (by year) of exchange rates in units of national currency per 
U.S. dollar. For Australia and Great Britain, figures are given in period averages 
of exchange rates in U.S. dollars per unit of national currency (IMF 1985: 6). 
For this analysis, the figures for Australia and Great Britain were converted to the 
former expression: period averages of exchange rates in units of national currency 
per U.S. dollar, in order to facilitate the conversion of all national currency units 
to U.S. dollars.
One important operational question that has to be addressed was the 
question as to whether the data should be in the form of inflated or deflated 
dollars. If comparisons are to be made from year to year in terms of whether 
absolute values of a given factor, such as absolute trade levels, are increasing or 
decreasing, deflated dollars are been a necessity. However, for the present analysis, 
the use of deflated dollars is not only unnecessary, but actually presents a 
disadvantage. The concern in this analysis is with changes over time in terms 
of the relationship of hegemonic power to the level of trade. Thus for each year, 
the power of the hegemon is being compared with international trade. One year
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is compared with another only in terms of the ratios described above, not in 
absolute terms. The key here is that both sides of the regression equations have 
to be treated the same. So long as this is the case, the ratios thus derived should 
theoretically be the same whether the dollars are inflated or deflated. The only 
difference is that there may be a small amount of additional error introduced by 
the use of deflators if deflated dollars are utilized. Thus deflated dollars are not 
used in the time series analyses.
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this research lies with the 
international political economy taken as a whole, rather than with the individual 
states comprising the system. To the extent that we are interested in the
individual states, it is on a comparative basis, especially in terms of their relative 
levels of economic power; specifically, the power of the hegemon relative to that 
of the other core states. The focus is thus on the system as a whole. 
Obviously, the question arises as to whether our inquiry actually addresses the 
system as a whole given that the dependent variables in the statistical tests are 
individual states.
This may addressed with two specific points. First, by examining a number 
of individual states relative to one another, we are able to determine much about 
the constitution of the system as a whole at a given time. Looking at one state 
alone would tell us little about the international system, but looking at a number 
of states can reveal much. In this context, Charles Ragin points out that in 
comparative social science, a distinction must be drawn between observational units 
and explanatory units. In the present analysis, the larger system is the explanatory
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unit, but individual states may nonetheless be used as data units (Ragin 1987: 
8 ) .
Second, our primary interest lies with shifts in the structure of the system 
over time. If we make certain determinations about the system for a number of 
years, we may compare the characteristics of the system over time (Chase-Dunn 
1979: 611). For our purposes, for example, we may determine how the overall 
ratios of trade to national income vary among system members (core members 
within the context of the present analysis) over time.
Time is an essential component of hegemonic stability theory. One 
dependent variable, system openness (expressed as the ratio of trade to national 
income) is examined over a period of time. The present study thus takes the 
form of a diachronic, or longitudinal study. Time-series analysis is a statistical 
technique which allows us to analyze the international system with points of time 
as the units of comparison (Hibbs 1974). The years that are included represent 
the basic system comparison points. Time series analysis thus allows for the 
comparison of the system with itself over a period of time.
The best technique for calculating a precise linear trend is least-squares 
regression. Following is the regression formula used in this analysis:
Yt = a + bXt + et
where:
Y = the ratio of trade to national income 
a = a constant term
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Xt = the measure of U.S. power (Trade Ratio, Per Capita Ratio, and Aggregate 
Ratio; each used separately in one equation) 
et = a random disturbance term
Findings
To simplify the presentation, I have given shortened names to each of 
the independent variables. The ratios of the trade level of the state with the 
highest level of trade, to that of the state with the second highest level of trade, 
are called "Trade Ratios." The ratios of the per capita GNP of the state with the 
highest GNP, to that of the GNP of the state with the second highest GNP, are 
called "Per Capita Ratios." The ratios of the aggregate GNP of the state with the 
highest aggregate GNP to that of the GNP of the state with the second highest 
GNP are called "Aggregate Ratio."
First the relationship between Trade Ratio and the ratios of trade to national 
income for each country included in the study will be examined. The ratio of 
trade to national income for each country was regressed on Trade Ratio. The 
U.S. accounted for the greatest level of international trade throughout the years 
included; the United Kingdom was next highest from 1958 through 1961, and 
Germany was the next highest for all remaining years (see Appendix One). For 
all but four of the countries, Japan, Australia, The Netherlands, and Denmark, 
there is a strong statistically significant (throughout this analysis, significance 
signifies p <= .05) negative relationship between Trade Ratio and the ratios of 
trade to national income. The R squares range from a high of .49763 for France,
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to a low of .24967 for Germany. For the remaining four countries, there is not 
a statistically significant relationship between Trade Ratio and the ratios of trade 
to national income. Throughout the time span for which data are included, the 
ratio of the level of U.S. trade to that of the country with the next highest trade 
level decreased. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, this should
result in lowered ratios of trade to national income. Exactly the opposite is the 
case. In general, the ratios of trade to national income increased in absolute terms 
throughout the time period under consideration. This runs directly counter to 
the theory of hegemonic stability.
TABLE ONE HERE
Next the relationship between Per Capita Ratio and the ratios of trade to 
national income for each country will be examined. The ratio of trade to national 
income for each country was regressed on Per Capita Ratio. For this
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variable, the U.S. did not have the highest value throughout the period as was 
the case for Trade Ratio, having lost ground during the time period under 
consideration. From 1958 through 1961, the U.S. had the highest per capita 
income, followed by Canada. From 1962 through 1972, the U.S. had the highest 
par capita income, followed by Sweden. In 1973 and 1974, Switzerland had the 
highest level, followed by Sweden. From 1975 through 1977, Sweden was 
highest, followed by Switzerland. From 1978 through 1980, Switzerland was 
highest, followed by Sweden. In 1981, Switzerland remained highest, but Norway 
was in second place. In 1982 and 1983, Switzerland was highest, followed by 
the U.S. (See Appendix Two).
For all but one of the countries included in the analysis, with the exception 
of Denmark, there is a strong statistically significant relationship between Per 
Capita Ratio and the ratios of trade to national income. The R squares vary from 
a high of .49031 for Norway to a low of .18454 for Australia. For Denmark, 
there is not a statistically significant relationship between Per Capita Ratio and the 
ratio of trade to national income.
The U.S. level of per capita income, decreased in general relative to that 
of the other countries throughout the period (despite a slight increase in 1982 
and 1983). Yet, as is mentioned above, the ratios of trade to national income 
increased in general throughout the period. The negative relationship between 
Per Capita Ratio and the ratios of trade to national income runs directly counter 




Country R2 Beta Significance
Australia .18454 .42958 . .0285
Austria .41713 -.64586 .0004
Belgium .37136 -.60939 .0010
Canada .37764 -.61452  .0008
Denmark .00829 -.09103 .6583
Finland .37319 -.61089 .0009
France .48997 -.69998 .0001
West Germany .37316 -.61087 .0009
Japan .29286 -.54117  .0043
The Netherlands .27804 -.52730 .0056
Norway .49031 -.70022  .0001
Sweden .37200 -.60992  .0009
Switzerland .25986 -.50976 .0078
United Kingdom (G.B.) .45454 -.67420 .0002
United States .39487 -.62839 .0006
Yt = a + bXf + et 
where:
Yt = the ratio of trade to national income 
a = a constant term
Xt = the ratio of U.S. per capita GNP to that of the next highest 
et = a random disturbance term
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Next the relationship between Aggregate Ratio and the ratios of trade to 
national income for each country will be examined. For each country, the ratio 
of trade to national income was regressed on Aggregate Ratio. From 1958 
through 1960, the United Kingdom had the second highest level of aggregate 
income of all of the countries included in the analysis. From 1961 through 1966, 
Germany had the second highest level. From 1967 through 1983 (and up to the 
present time) Japan was in second place. Additionally, it should be noted that 
Japan continued to narrow the gap with the U.S. throughout this period, as it still 
is doing (see Appendix Three).
There is a strong statistically significant negative relationship between 
Aggregate Ratio and the ratios of trade to national income for all of the countries 
except Australia and Denmark. For the latter two countries, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between Aggregate Ratio and the ratios of trade 
to national income. For all of the other countries, the findings again run directly 
counter to the theory of hegemonic stability. The R Squares vary from a high 
of .89101 for Canada, to a low of .44194 for Japan. As U.S. power measured 
in terms of its level of aggregate income relative to that of other industrial 


































































Yt = a + bX{ + et 
where:
Y = the ratio of trade to national income 
a = a constant term
Xt = the ratio of U.S. GNP to that of the next highest 
et = the random disturbance term
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Altogether, the results seem to provide substantial evidence that runs counter 
to hegemonic stability theory. As U.S. power, particularly economic power, 
declined, international trade levels continued to increase; this is exactly the opposite 
of what would be predicted on the basis of hegemonic stability theory. This is 
the case not only in terms of hegemonic stability theory in general, but also v is - 
a-v is Robert Keohane’s version of the theory which focuses upon individual 
regimes. Even when limiting the focus to international trade specifically (as is 
done in the regression utilizing Trade Ratio), the results run counter to what 
would be expected utilizing hegemonic stability theory as the basis for analysis. 
Analysis of a sample of countries for which data are available through 1987 
revealed no basic changes in these findings.
The final chapter presents a discussion of these findings. The question of 
their validity is examined. Finally, the implications of the findings for the 
international economic order of the coming decades will be discussed.
Chapter Five
In this chapter, the findings derived from the statistical test of hegemony 
that is set forth in Chapter Four will be discussed. First, the question as to 
whether the findings are valid will be examined. Second, a brief section on 
prospects for the United States over the coming several decades, in terms of its 
position in the international political economy, is presented. This is of central 
importance to the international political economy and the question of market 
openness as a whole, since the United States is still the largest economic player 
in the world, despite the relative decline that has taken place. Finally, the manner 
in which current macro political/economic trends are likely to affect the question 
of market openness and system stability over the coming several decades is 
examined.
Validity of Findings
The finding that ratios of trade to national income increased for the 
industrialized countries, as American economic power declined, suggests four 
distinct possibilities. The first is that the measurement devices utilized in this 
analysis do not accurately measure that which they were intended to measure. 
The second is that currency exchange rates are skewing the data in a particular 
direction that obscures the picture of what actually is happening in the
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international political economy. The third possibility is that hegemonic stability 
theory is, in fact, largely valid, but that the period of time required for the decline 
of a hegemon to lead to a decline in international trade is much greater than the 
forty plus years since the end of World War II, when the U.S. first emerged as 
the hegemonic power. The fourth possibility is that hegemonic stability theory 
simply is invalid; that it is incorrect even in its most basic premise.
Measurement Suitability
It is, of course, always possible that the measurement devices employed in 
an analysis do not measure the intended target, or at least that they do not do 
so accurately. Although this possibility can rarely be completely discounted, I will 
argue that it is highly unlikely ihat the findings in the present study are due either 
to unsuitability of the devices employed, or due to measurement error.
All three of the independent variables that were utilized, the level of the 
hegemon’s trade relative to that of the next highest, the level of the hegemon’s 
Gross National Product relative to that of the next highest, and the hegemon’s 
level of per capita income relative to that of the next highest, are considered to 
be primary measures of hegemonic power within the context of hegemonic stability 
theory. Indeed, all three of these variables are widely used in general as 
measures of the economic strength of states. For this study all of these figures 
were taken from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook, published by the 
International Monetary Fund, which is generally considered to be the most reliable 
source for such figures. Although no figures of the sort employed here are
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perfect, it is highly unlikely that any errors present in these data are of sufficient 
magnitude to lead to incorrect results.
The central tenant of hegemonic stability theory holds that international 
trade will decline as a percentage of aggregate economic activity, as the hegemon 
loses its position. In fact, some versions of the theory hold that trade levels 
decline on an absolute level, and not simply as a percentage of aggregate economic 
activity. As the present analysis demonstrates, at least for the period under 
consideration not even the more conservative proposition that international trade 
as a percentage of aggregate economic activity declines as the hegemon loses its 
position is shown to be valid. The important point here is that the ratios of 
trade to national income are clearly appropriate as the dependent variables. This 
is a direct measure of the level of a state’s international trade as a proportion of 
its aggregate economic activity.
Again, the data are derived from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, a highly reliable source. It should 
further be noted that the data for both the independent and the dependent 
variables are for major industrial societies. This is noteworthy due to the fact 
that economic data from the industrialized countries tend to be more accurate 
than that from less developed countries, since the industrial nations generally have 
the best systems for the collection and processing of data.
Finally, time series analysis utilizing multiple regression analysis is highly 
appropriate for the task for which it is utilized here. For a more full discussion, 
see Chapter Three. Taken together, the factors discussed above make it highly
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unlikely that the basic findings in the analysis are incorrect due to measurement 
error.
Currency Exchange Rates
It is possible that currency exchange rates have operated an a manner that 
skew the data in a given direction that may readily lead to misleading conclusions. 
All data for this analysis has been in U.S. dollars, and therefore the analysis is 
certainly sensitive to this factor. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the currency
exchange rates are leading to erroneous findings in this case.
It needs to be noted that the method of setting currency exchange rates 
changed drastically during the period of years for which data are included in this 
analysis. For the first years of the data, 1957 through 1970, all conversion rates 
were at a "fixed" rate, under the terms of the Bretton Woods monetary accord. 
All currencies were pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar, which was itself 
pegged to the rate of gold. In 1971, the Nixon Administration removed the U.S. 
from the gold standard, and the Bretton Woods monetary regime collapsed. 1971 
began with fixed exchange rates still in place, but ended with a system of 
"floating" exchange. Under this latter system, exchange values are constantly
fluctuating in accordance with the perceived meaning of various economic
indicators for each state, such as the growth rate, inflation rate, size of the money 
supply, etc.
Only a drastic exchange value problem could case the findings in the present 
analysis to be invalid. Such a value problem would have to exist between the
98
U.S. dollar and the currencies of virtually all of the other nations included in this 
analysis, given that the findings generally hold for almost all of the countries. 
Furthermore, there is complete scholarly agreement about two basic points. First, 
U.S. economic power has declined relative to that of other major states. Second, 
the level of international trade has continued to increase. Thus, any exchange 
valuation problems that may be present are not sufficient to alter the basic 
direction of the findings.
Regime Lag
Next I will discuss the possibility that hegemonic stability theory is valid, 
but that the erosion of hegemony leads only quite slowly to a decrease in the 
level of trade will be discussed. Hegemonic stability theorists have themselves 
suggested that there may be a considerable lag between changes in the relative 
power level of the hegemon and changes in the level of international trade. This 
argument is predicated upon the existence of international regimes that stay in 
place for a considerable amount of time even after the conditions under which 
they were created have been greatly changed.
As discussed in Chapter Three, a major focus of U.S. policy in the 
immediate post World War II period was the establishment of an open 
international trade regime. There was a strong policy orientation toward doing 
whatever was deemed necessary in order to increase international trade. 
Institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund were initially designed to
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play major roles in the facilitation of such trade. It is, after all, a truism that 
sufficient liquidity must be present if states are to be viable economic actors, 
capable of buying and selling in substantial quantities on the international market.
While it is true that these institutions did not serve the purpose of 
supplying such liquidity particularly well, the U.S. did serve as the lender of last 
resort during this period, and thus did provide much of the liquidity necessary to 
begin increasing trade levels. Most importantly, the U.S. was able to get the then 
secondary powers, particularly France, Great Britain, and West Germany, to adopt 
relatively open market stances. Under the international trade regime thus 
established, trade levels have increased markedly, as we have seen. A t least to 
some degree, this regime has outlasted the period of American hegemony. There 
have been some notable blows to the regime, such as the contingency provisions 
of GATT and the increased use of quotas or voluntary restraints (see Chapter 
Three), but nonetheless the market remains relatively open. Trade levels have 
continued to increase.
It remains possible that the erosion of the trade regime, to some degree 
begun by the restrictions noted above, will continue. While the erosion thus far 
has not been sufficient to stop the growth of international trade, this may well 
not be the case if the erosion continues. As there is currently a general tendency 
toward the increased implementation of restrictive mechanisms, it is quite plausible 
that this erosion could, in fact, continue to the point where the growth of 
international trade may slow; eventually international trade levels may decline in 
absolute terms. If this happens, it will support the basic premise of hegemonic
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stability theory. It will merely have to be noted that the regime lag is quite 
substantial.
Is the Theory of Hegemonic Stability Invalid?
The fourth possible explanation behind the finding that international trade 
has continued to increase during a period in which American economic power 
has been in continual decline is that hegemonic stability theory is simply incorrect 
in its most basic premise. A strong possibility that must be considered within 
this context is that hegemonic stability theory may be valid v is -a -v is  the world 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but not for the present world. 
Certainly the structure of the international political economy is vastly different in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century from its form in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.
The decline of British hegemony in the nineteenth century was accompanied 
by (and at least to a certain extent caused) a last major wave of colonization. 
Great Britain itself was, of course, a major player in this process. In turn, a 
series of restrictive trade arrangements was established within colonial groups that 
were each headed by a single dominant country. This led to a fractionalization 
of the international market. A return to colonialism in the present world is 
indeed highly unlikely. It is made so both by the nature of East-W est relations, 
which would make recolonization quite difficult, and also by the extremely high 
level of interconnectedness between the industrial states. Many scholars argue that
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colonialism has ceased entirely to be a viable form of organization (Bergesen and 
Schoenberg 1980: 263).
In lieu of a return to colonial organization, it has generally been suggested 
(within the context of hegemonic stability theory, as well as by World Systems 
Theorists and Cycle Theorists) instead that the decline of a hegemon would lead 
to some form of regional encapsulations. Specifically, this refers to a situation 
wherein the larger industrial states enter into exclusionary trade arrangements with 
those states with which they are most predominant in terms of trade, thus forming 
a series of relatively closed trading systems. Aside from the geopolitical realities 
that would make a return to colonialism difficult, this form of organization, with 
dominant states having a preponderance of economic control over weaker states, 
but without direct political control (taken to be unnecessary given the indirect 
political control resulting from sufficiently tight economic control) is much more 
efficient than colonialism in that it accomplishes the same basic goals without the 
much higher costs inherent in the maintenance of colonial relationships. This type 
of arrangement is generally referred to as neo-mercantilism.
Nonetheless while some form of regional encapsulation is certainly a 
possibility, there are structural constraints in the present international political 
economy that make this rather unlikely, at least in the relatively near future. 
Perhaps the single most important economic difference between the nineteenth 
century world and that of the late twentieth century is the degree to which the 
major states and economies of the world are interconnected. Although it is 
certainly true that there has to some degree been an integrated capitalist world 
economy since the seventeenth century, the degree of interconnection that exists
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today between legally autonomous states is unparalled in world history. Further, 
the degree of interconnectedness continues to increase. This results in a degree 
of interdependence that is quite far removed from the form of the international 
political economy of the nineteenth century.
The increased levels of trade that have been noted are themselves indicative 
of the increasing interconnectedness of the world’s economies, making it difficult 
to even speak in terms of single economies in a meaningful sense. It is also 
important to consider the fact that most trade takes place between the 
industrialized states, rather than between industrialized and non-industrialized states. 
Trade between industrialized and non-industrialized states, while certainly 
important, represents a small portion of world trade. (It is interesting to note 
that a much higher portion of U.S. trade is with non-industrialized states than 
is the case for any of the other industrialized states. Therefore, even if regional 
encapsulation becomes technically possible, this will not be sufficient to maintain 
the levels of trade to which the industrialized states have become accustomed, and, 
indeed, are dependent upon.
Multinational corporations have played a major role in increasing the 
interconnectedness of the economies of the industrialized states. This, of course, 
is not something that the corporations set out to do intentionally, but rather is 
an unplanned consequence of the collective actions of corporations in fostering an 
international business system within weak geographical boundaries. Obviously this 
would not have been possible without at least some degree of cooperation by 
governments of the industrial states. On the part of the U.S. in particular in the 
post World War II period, there was an intentional effort to forge this type of
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an international environment. Multinational corporations have served to increase 
interconnectedness in two basic ways. First, the increased level of international 
trade that they have engendered has led to greater interconnectedness, given the 
increase in regularized contacts, exchanges, and thus interdependence this entails. 
Second, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of international firms 
for which direct foreign investment represents a major portion of their economic 
activity. Few of these firms could exist as viable entities with sizes anywhere 
near their current levels were they forced to rely principally upon a single home 
market and perhaps a few markets in less developed countries. Given the strong 
symbiotic relationships that often exist between large firms and governments, and 
given the large portion of the national economies represented by the multinational 
firms, there is a strong impetus for governments to support at least a relatively 
open international economic order, rather than to move toward the establishment 
of closed trading blocs.
Clearly the degree to which the constituent components of a system are or 
are not integrated is one of the central determinants of the level of stability of 
the system. For a political system, there is not a clear-cut answer as to whether 
increasing interconnectedness will serve to act a stabilizing or a destabilizing 
attribute of the system. Nonetheless, the possibility that it may serve to increase 
stability certainly needs to be considered. At the very least, a high level of 
interconnectedness along an economic dimension makes the costs of system failure 
considerably higher than would otherwise be the case. If trade levels decrease 
significantly, it will have a strongly deleterious affect upon all of the industrial 
countries. There simply cannot, for the foreseeable future, be sufficiently large
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increases in trade between industrial and non-industrial countries to offset 
significant losses in trade among industrial countries. The non-industrial countries 
do not have sufficient amounts of capital to make this possible. Therefore, a 
significant decrease in trade among industrial states will result in a substantially 
reduced level of aggregate trade.
Prospects for the U.S.
It was virtually inevitable that the U.S. would experience some decline in 
its relative economic position in the world in the past two to three decades. 
After the end of World War II, the U.S. was left in an unusually strong position 
relative to the other major states, which had been devastated by war. As the U.S.
lost position, major structural adjustments have taken place in the world economy.
1
The U.S. ability to manage international economic policy has been greatly altered 
as a result. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the international 
monetary policy.
In the international monetaiy regime the U.S. fostered after World War II, 
the currencies of major countries ware valued in terms of U.S. dollars, and could 
readily be converted to dollars or other currencies, as well as gold. The U.S. 
dollar itself was pegged to gold at a fixed rate. This arrangement caused there 
to be distinct advantages and disadvantages for the U.S. The primary disadvantage 
was that it made it extremely difficult for the U.S. to adjust its currency value 
(Jacobson and Sidjanski 1982: 26). This could be particularly troublesome for 
the U.S. when the U.S. dollar was overvalued, thus making exporting difficult.
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Other countries generally did not want any devaluation of the U.S. dollars for two 
specific reasons. First, it would make American goods yet more competitive than 
they already were in the world market. Second, since the U.S. dollar was the 
principal reserve currency of the Western world, any devaluation of the dollar 
would have had an extremely negative affect on the reserves of the other countries.
On the positive side for the U.S., the U.S. was able to (and did) run
balance of payments deficits without having to borrow. This was made possible
by the fact that corporations and governments would hold U.S. dollars as reserve 
assets (Jacobson and Sidjanski 1982:' 26). The U.S. dollar no longer serves this 
function. It is true that governments and corporations still hold some U.S. dollars 
as reserve assets, but this is also true for other major international currencies such 
as the British Pound, the German Mark, the Swiss Franc, and the Japanese Yen. 
The U.S. government now does have to borrow to finance its deficits. 
Significantly, an increasingly large portion of the borrowing is taking place in 
foreign markets. This is important in that borrowing in foreign markets has a 
decidedly different effect upon the home market than borrowing from domestic 
sources. Interest paid on domestic borrowing remains in the domestic economy,
and much of it is likely to be recirculated in some form of spending. A much
smaller portion of interest paid to foreign sources will be recirculated within the 
U.S. in this manner. Given the immense size of the current U.S. cumulative debt 
(approximately two trillion dollars), this will constitute an immense drain on U.S. 
capital. In turn, this will further limit U.S. economic power, and will thus give 
the U.S. even less ability to determine international economic policy than it has 
currently. This decline of the U.S. economy will further limit the ability of the
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U.S. to maintain an open international economic order (whether or not it will 
even attempt to do so, is another matter, which will be addressed below).
The relative decline of U.S. economic strength will also diminish the ability 
of the U.S. to shape the economic policy of less developed countries. This is 
includes, of course, policies related to market openness. As a result of the 
declining relative economic strength of the U.S. there has been a precipitous decline 
in the percentage of its GNP that the U.S. gives in the form of official 
development assistance. In 1965, the U.S. ranked third among the industrialized 
countries in terms of the percentage of its GNP it gave as official development 
assistance, with .58%, below only Belgium (.60% ) and France (.76% ). By 
1986, the U.S. had fallen to second to last in this category among the seventeen 
industrialized nations (as classified by the World Bank), with only .23% of its 
GNP going as official development assistance.
It has already been noted that direct foreign investment is on the rise for 
a number of highly developed states. Investment by non-U .S. based firms is 
likely to increase in less developed countries faster than investment by U.S. based 
firms. This will further erode U.S. control over the economic policies of the less 
developed countries. Taken together with the decline in development assistance, 




One factor that should have a significant impact upon international economic 
relations is the unified European market that is planned for 1992. This plan calls 
for all barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers to 
be removed by the twelve European Economic Community member states. The 
barriers would only be dropped v is -a -v is  movement among the twelve member 
states. If this arrangement is fully implemented, the effect will be to a create a 
single, unified market. This would make the EEC the largest market in the 
world. It is important to remember that most of the EEC member countries are 
highly developed core states. Those that are not, Spain and Portugal (Italy is 
discussed specifically in Chapter Three), are nonetheless states of a middle level 
of development (semi-peripheral), and are more developed than the majority of 
the world’s countries.
The mere fact of the existence of a single market this large will itself have 
a major impact upon the structure of the international political economy. One 
likely result will be the emergence of more European companies as strong 
international competitors. Since domestic firms in each EEC member state will 
no longer be protected in their home markets, it will be necessary for many 
firms to either merge with other firms or to enlarge through other means simply 
in order to be able to compete in their home markets. Further, firms will expand 
to take advantage of their new ability to compete on an even footing in other 
European markets. It is interesting to note in this context that at the present, 
1988, the beginnings of a merger wave in the EEC may already be seen, with 
firms stating outright that they are merging in order to protect or enlarge their 
market positions through preparation for the changes anticipated for 1992. The
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result will be the collapse or submergence of numerous smaller firms, and the 
concomitant emergence of larger firms with greatly increased international 
marketing and investment capabilities. This will give European firms a 
considerably greater degree of influence in the international market, thus, in turn, 
strengthening, at least to some degree, the positions of the European governments 
in terms of international economic policy. To the extent that the European 
Parliament is able to increase its authority within the EEC, this increased 
centralization of power will be likely to strengthen yet further the European 
position. This latter point, however, brings up a crucial issue.
In order for the unified market to advance from a theoretical level to that 
of practice, numerous specific pieces of legislation must be enacted by the EEC 
member governments. There are two central obstacles to this occurrence. First, 
there is considerable fear by some, both in government and business in each 
country, that enterprises in their own countries will suffer too much at the hands 
of the resulting increase in competition by firms from other EEC member states. 
Second, the opening of the market will remove a great deal of authority from the 
member governments. In the process, the European Parliament will doubtless 
increase its authority, although to what degree is not yet clear. This will result 
in loud cries from some, of the loss of national sovereignty. A strong precursor 
to this was seen in a recent speech by Margaret Thatcher, in which she decried 
the loss of sovereignty that she maintains will occur is the blueprint of the 
European Parliament for 1992 is strictly followed. Thus, even given the 
assumption that all of the initial necessary legislation is passed, there will continue 
to be tension between the desire of governments, on the one hand, to build a
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strong centralized market, and on the other, to reassert whatever authority they 
are losing. If the latter sentiments win out, the concept cannot succeed.
Another question that is central to the plans for 1992 is whether or not 
a unified European market, if it becomes a reality, will remain open to goods 
from outside, or whether various barriers to outside goods will be erected. Up 
to the present, members of the European Economic Community have been able 
to erect such barriers under the terms of Article 115 of the European Economic 
Community treaty. For example, under this provision the Italian government 
currently limits Japanese auto imports to 2,000 per year. Under the current 
proposal for a unified European market, restrictions on goods from outside the 
bloc would be ruled out.
There is some concern that nationalist sentiments in some of the EEC 
member countries will eventually cause the bloc as a whole to place restrictions 
on exports from outside. Indeed, a number of companies from outside the bloc 
are quickly opening subsidiaries in a member country precisely for this reason. 
Goods produced within the bloc by these subsidiaries, of course, would not be 
subject to such barriers. A  number of leading European politicians have expressed 
concerns about such nationalist sentiments. For example, Otto Lambsdorff, the 
head of West Germany’s Free Democratic Party, and a partner in Helumut Kohl’s 
coalition government, himself a proponent of a completely open market, has 
warned that strong nationalistic and protectionist sentiments, particularly in France 
and Italy, could eventually lead to the erection of trade barriers. Therefore, two 
clear questions remain. First, will the integrated European market become a 
reality? Second, if it does become a reality, will it maintain an open trade policy
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v is-a -v is  good from outside? Regardless of the answer to the second question, 
one thing is quite clear. An integrated European market will be the largest in 
the world, and this fact will mean that the balance of global economic power will 
be significantly altered. To the extent that EEC policy comes to be controlled 
more and more by the European Parliament, rather than by individual national 
governments, this will increase further still the EEC’s position. This will result 
in a further erosion of American economic influence.
The Future of GATT
The future of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade remains unclear 
at the present time. It has already been noted that the Tokyo Round resulted in 
an increase in the use of non-tariff barriers to trade. There is some indication 
that this aspect of GATT policy will soon be redressed. This is quite noteworthy, 
particularly given that this should not happen according to hegemonic stability 
theory, given that the system currently has no hegemon.
The next stage of GATT policy is in the process of formulation at the 
present time. At the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations of GATT, now in 
progress, there is a strong movement toward the dismantling of non-tariff barriers 
to trade (Leonard Silk 1989). It is perfectly clear to all participants that many 
tariff barriers have been replaced by non-tariff barriers, and a majority of the 
major participants seem to favor the removal of these barriers. If this effort is 
successful, it will certainly have a positive affect upon the level of international 
trade.
I l l
The New International Economic Order
In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly declared the need for a 
"New International Economic Order." This declaration, drafted and pushed by 
the Group of 77 (an organization of non-aligned states now numbering well 
over one hundred members), presents a rough blueprint for a future world order 
with a structure quite different from that of the present. As would be expected, 
the general goal of the NIEO is to increase the self-determination of the LDCs, 
and to decrease the disparities between LDCs and MDCs (Reubens 1981: 1).
The call for a New International Economic Order rests upon the concept 
that the present world order is structured in such a manner that the gap between 
LDCs and MDCs will continue to widen, rather than to narrow. Many advocates 
of the NIEO argue that this problem is caused primarily by willful exploitation 
of agents in the MDCs. They cite such practices of MNC firms as the charging 
of overly high interest for loans to LDCs, undervaluing of LDC resources in 
transfer prices*, and interference of foreign actors in local affairs. However, a 
number of advocates maintain that even to the extent that such abuses occur, they 
are largely the result of larger structural forces. For example, it is argued that 
the market is structured such that there is competition for primary products from 
LDCs, thus depressing prices, while MDC products incorporating higher levels of 
processing or manufacturing tend to be controlled by oligopoly (Reubens 1981: 
8). Regardless of whether their focus is more upon individual agents or upon 
the market as a whole, all proponents of the NIEO agree that the market needs
1 12
to be reorganized. With regard to many products, there is a preference for 
authoritative allocation, rather than for allocation according to "free market" 
principles.
Not surprisingly, the MDCs have been singularly unsympathetic toward the 
NIEO Demands. Representatives from MDCs generally insist that authoritative 
allocation must be rejected, as this is anathema to the principal of a "free market." 
It is maintained that the free market remains the most efficient means for the 
distribution of global resources. Of course, the question of "most efficient for 
whom" is generally left out of this equation. There seems to be little chance that 
most LDCs will, within the foreseeable future, be able to significantly increase 
their position in the global international stratification system through 
participation in the extent market system. This would be the case even were 
free trade really in place, given LDC competitive disadvantages, but is even more 
so given that there are so many protective barriers against processed goods from 
the LDCs. This argument between MDCs and LDCs over the means of resource 
allocation to be utilized will doubtless remain the most contentious issue in 
N orth-South relations.
Hegemonic War
In the past, the dissolution of a hegemonic system may well have led to 
a system disequilibrium that would be solved only by a hegemonic war. Robert 
Gilpin is certainly correct in his assertion, quoted in Chapter Two, that throughout 
history war has been the primary means for resolving system disequilibrium and
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for redistributing power. Although hegemonic war still must be considered as a 
very real possibility, it no longer may reasonably be considered by decision­
makers as a viable means of power redistribution. Without question, the advent 
of nuclear war has drastically altered the utility of hegemonic war for such 
purposes.
Conclusions
A  major change has taken place in the international political economy over 
the past two to three decades. The United States has rapidly declined in 
economic power relative to other major states. This decline is continuing to the 
present. Indeed, in 1988, for the first time since the end of World War II, the 
U.S. fell from first place even in terms of the aggregate amount of exports for 
which it accounts. West Germany is now the largest exporter. This is an 
astounding fact, given that this represents approximately four times the level of 
exports per capita as that accounted for by the U.S.
This loss of economic power has been accompanied by a loss of political 
power, such that the U.S. is not able to dictate international policy to the same 
degree that it was able to in the recent past. There is no significant evidence to 
suggest that this trend will change over the coming decades.
The world of the coming decades will be one with a multipolar structure. 
In terms of the West, The U.S., West Germany, Japan, France, and the U.K. will 
remain the dominant powers, followed by the smaller highly developed European
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states, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. If current trends continue, power will 
continue to be diffused more and more among this group of states.
It is difficult to determine the degree to which the international market 
will be open in such a multipolar world. As has been shown, despite movement 
toward the implementation of some restrictive mechanisms, the level of world 
trade has continued to increase up to the present. Contrary to hegemonic stability 
theory, there seems to be at least a reasonable chance that the market will remain 
relatively open. The decline of U.S. power has not led to a decline in world 
trade.
There will definitely be strong forces in favor of closing the market. In 
the U.S., for example, there are, and will doubtless continue to be, increasing calls 
for the implementation of protectionist policies as American firms face increased 
competition in the home market from foreign firms. If such policies are 
implemented on a large scale, other countries will doubtless reciprocate. Further, 
the question of European market openness, particularly in light of the uncertainties 
over the proposal for an integrated European market, remains.
It seems likely that East-W est trade will continue to increase, to the point 
where it will truly represent a significant portion of the international trade in 
which Western countries are involved. It is, of course, impossible to predict with 
any reasonable degree of certainty what specific effects this is likely to have on 
the basic structure of the international economy. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that it will, at least to some degree, increase the aggregate level of 
international trade, and along with this, the level of interconnectedness.
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Regardless of the direction in which the international economy travels in the 
coming decades, there seems to be a reasonable chance that the market will remain 
relatively open. Certainly recent trade figures are positive with this regard: in
1988, world trade increased by over eight percent, a figure that far exceeds that 
of overall world economic growth. There is evidence, presented in this analysis, 
that a hegemon may not be essential in order to foster the cooperation necessary 
to maintain a world with ah open international economic order, and, indeed, with 
other cooperative regimes.
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International Trade (Highest and Next Highest)
High/Next Total Trade (Billions $U.S.) Year
High U.S. 32.536 1958
Next U.K. 20.230 1958
High U.S. 34.649 1959
Next U.K. 21.395 1959
High U.S. 36.982 1960
Next U.K. 23.643 1960
High U.S. 36.989 1961
Next U.K. 23.803 1961
High U.S. 39.516 1962
Next W. Germany 25.619 1962
High U.S. 42.027 1963
Next W. Germany 27.648 1963
High U.S. 46.984 1964
Next W. Germany 30.940 1964
High U.S. 50.763 1965
Next W. Germany 35.525 1965
High U.S. 58.225 1966
Next W. Germany 38.324 1966
High U.S. 60.459 1967
Next W. Germany 39.307 1967
High U.S. 70.105 1968
Next W. Germany 45.183 1968
High U.S. 76.530 1969
Next W. Germany 53.728 1969
High U.S. 85.936 1970
Next W. Germany 64.175 1970
High U.S. 92.911 1971
Next W. Germany 73.540 1971
High U.S. 109.111 1972
Next W. Germany 87.114 1972
High U.S. 145.684 1973
Next W. Germany 122.454 1973
High U.S. 209.427 1974
Next W. Germany 159.029 1974
High U.S. 213.992 1975
Next W. Germany 165.106 1975
High U.S. 247.900 1976
1 2 2
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Next W. Germany 190.584 1976
High U.S. 281.643 1977
Next W. Germany 219.530 1977
High U.S. 329.811 1978
Next W. Germany 264.208 1978
High U.S. 404.253 1979
Next W. Germany 331.450 1979
High U.S. 477.770 1980
Next W. Germany 380.863 1980
High U.S. 507.091 1981
Next W. Germany 340.004 1981
High U.S. 467.160 1982
Next W. Germany 331.805 1982
High U.S. 470.416 1983
Next W. Germany 322.382 1983
Appendix Two
Per Capita GNP (Highest and Next Highest) 
High/Next Per Capita GNP ( Bill. $U.S.) Year
High U.S. 2.571 1958
Next Canada 2.092 1958
High U.S. 2.744 1959
Next Canada 2.193 1959
High U.S. 2.803 1960
Next Canada 2.208 I960
High U.S. 2.856 1961
Next Canada 2.142 1961
High U.S. 3.029 1962
Next Sweden 2.182 1962
High U.S. 3.153 1963
Next Sweden 2.317 1963
High U.S. 3.323 1964
Next Sweden 2.567 1964
High U.S. 3.557 1965
Next Sweden 2.796 1965
High U.S. 3.846 1966
Next Sweden 3.013 1966
High U.S. 4.024 1967
Next Sweden 3.244 1967
High U.S. 4.352 1968
Next Sweden 3.421 1968
High U.S. 4.658 1969
Next Sweden 3.687 1969
High U.S. 4.841 1970
Next Sweden 4.140 1970
High U.S. 5.819 1971
Next Sweden 4.497 1971
High U.S. 5.650 1972
Next Sweden 5.279 1972
High Switzerland 6.609 1973
Next Sweden 6.400 1973
High Switzerland 7.636 1974
Next Sweden 7.091 1974
High Sweden 8.869 1975
Next Switzerland 8.740 1975
High Sweden 9.511 1976
Next Switzerland 9.272 1976
High Sweden 9.988 1977
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Next Switzerland 9.982 1977
High Switzerland 13.894 1978
Next Sweden 10.986 1978
High Switzerland 15.619 1979
Next Sweden 12.973 1979
High Switzerland 16.555 1980
Next Sweden 14.824 1980
High Switzerland 15.362 1981
Next Norway 13.474 1981
High Switzerland 15.623 1982
Next U.S. 13.226 1982
High Switzerland 15.711 1983
Next U.S. 14.093 1983
Appendix Three
Aggregate GNP (Highest and Next Highest)
High/Next Aggregate GNP (Bill. $U.S.) Year
High U.S. 449.700 1958
Next U.K. 65.408 1958
High U.S. 487.900 1959
Next U.K. 68.768 1959
High U.S. 506.500 1960
Next U.K. 72.744 1960
High U.S. 524.600 1961
Next W. Germany 82.172 1961
High U.S. 565.000 1962
Next W. Germany 90.125 1962
High U.S. 596.700 1963
Next W. Germany 95.525 1963
High U.S. 637.700 1964
Next W. Germany 104.900 1964
High U.S. 691.100 1965
Next W. Germany 114.550 1965
High U.S. 756.000 1966
Next W. Germany 121.850 1966
High U.S. 799.600 1967
Next Japan 123.508 1967
High U.S. 873.400 1968
Next Japan 146.397 1968
High U.S. 944.000 1969
Next Japan 172.272 1969
High U.S. 992.700 1970
Next Japan 203.133 1970
High U.S. 1077.600 1971
Next Japan 230.504 1971
High U.S. 1185.900 1972
Next Japan 304.493 1972
High U.S. 1326.400 1973
Next Japan 413.842 1973
High U.S. 1434.200 1974
Next Japan 458.511 1974
High U.S. 1549.200 1975
Next Japan 498.154 1975
High U.S. 1718.000 1976
Next Japan 558.740 1976
High U.S. 1918.300 1977
Next Japan 686.634 1977
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